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JUDGING PATENTS

SAPNA KUMAR*
ABSTRACT
Patent litigation is regarded as the “neurosurgery of litigation.” To
adjudicate these cases, judges must grasp complex technology
underlying the claims at issue, notwithstanding the fact that many
judges lack relevant science or technology backgrounds. This problem
is compounded by the fact that judges generally lack access to neutral
expertise, forcing them to rely upon party-hired experts for tutorials.
By contrast, several European patent courts utilize technically
qualified judges who work side by side with their legally trained
counterparts to decide patent cases. The integration of technical
expertise into the judiciary improves the speed of litigation, provides
the court with unbiased information, and likely increases the
accuracy of the judges’ claim construction. This Article examines the
role of technical expertise in patent litigation and discusses obstacles
to U.S. district courts obtaining assistance. It then looks at the use
of technically qualified judges in Germany and Switzerland, as well
as in the European Union’s proposed Unified Patent Court, and it
Law Foundation Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. The author
would like to thank Suelen Carls, Rochelle Dreyfuss, Becky Eisenberg, Dave Fagundes, Susy
Frankel, Christophe Geiger, Dietmar Harhoff, Mark Janis, Marshall Leaffer, Matthias
Leistner, Zahr Said, Xavier Seuba, Janewa Osei-Tutu, and Greg Vetter for their helpful
comments. She would also like to thank the participants of the Max Planck Institute for
Innovation and Competition’s Patentrechtszyklus, the 2019 ATRIP conference, the University
of Michigan Law School Intellectual Property Workshop, the Indiana University Mauer
School of Law Intellectual Property Colloquium, the Indiana University McKinney School of
Law Distinguished Lecture Series, and the M3 Intellectual Property Scholarship Workshop.
This project was made possible by a Fulbright-Schuman Innovation Grant, which was
jointly financed by the U.S. State Department and the Directorate-General for Education and
Culture of the European Commission. The grant enabled the author to spend five months
researching at the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition in Germany and the
University of Strasbourg’s Center for International Intellectual Property in France.

871

872

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:871

discusses advantages and disadvantages of their use. The Article
finally proposes increasing technical expertise in the U.S. judiciary
by utilizing technically trained judges or staff. It further suggests
streamlining all U.S. patent litigation into a group of urban district
courts, which could employ neutral technical experts.
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INTRODUCTION
Patent infringement disputes are among the most challenging
cases brought in federal district court. Judges admittedly disagree
regarding whether the underlying legal principles are especially
difficult,1 or whether the law poses challenges to judges because
they infrequently encounter patent cases and are unfamiliar with
the relevant case law.2 But there is general agreement that patent
cases force judges to grapple with unfamiliar technology,3 leading at
least one judge to dub patent cases “the neurosurgery of litigation.”4 District judges generally lack scientific backgrounds and are
ill-equipped to understand the technical issues that arise in these
cases.5 This makes it challenging for them to accurately construe
claims and to properly tailor general patent law doctrines to specific technology.6
1. Compare Kathleen M. O’Malley, Patti Saris & Ronald H. Whyte, A Panel Discussion:
Claim Construction from the Perspective of the District Judge, 54 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 671,
682 (2004) (observing that patent litigation “is hard legally” (remarks of Hon. Patti Saris)),
with Diane P. Wood, Keynote Address: Is It Time to Abolish the Federal Circuit’s Exclusive
Jurisdiction in Patent Cases?, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1, 7 (2013) (maintaining that
“the basic legal principles” of patent law “are relatively straightforward”).
2. See James F. Holderman, Judicial Patent Specialization: A View from the Trial Bench,
2002 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 425, 429 (observing that district judges who do not hear many
patent cases must “brush up” on the relevant case law when confronted with a patent case);
see also Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent
System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1097 (2003) (noting that “the typical district judge”
is unlikely to “see more than a few patent cases over the course of her tenure”).
3. See Holderman, supra note 2, at 429, 431-32 (discussing how patent cases require
judges to devote time to learning unfamiliar technology and Federal Circuit case law);
O’Malley et al., supra note 1, at 682 (noting that patent litigation “is hard scientifically”
(remarks of Hon. Patti Saris)); Wood, supra note 1, at 7 (“[P]atent claims may involve very
complicated technology.” (emphasis removed)).
4. O’Malley et al., supra note 1, at 682 (remarks of Hon. Patti Saris).
5. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 993 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Mayer,
C.J., concurring) (“[T]here is simply no reason to believe that judges are any more qualified
than juries to resolve the complex technical issues often present in patent cases.”); Kimberly
A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
1, 38 (2001) (“The 33% reversal rate of district court claim constructions suggests that judges
are not, at present, capable of resolving these issues with sufficient accuracy.”).
6. Jeanne C. Fromer, District Courts as Patent Laboratories, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 307,
315 (2011) (observing that district judges’ lack of relevant technical background makes it
“hard for them to understand often complex patented technologies and the industries in which
they occur”).
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Judicial expertise and specialization are multidimensional, encompassing legal and technical knowledge.7 Under the current
system, some judges possess legal expertise with regard to patent
law, given that 61 percent of new patent cases are filed in just five
district courts.8 At the appellate level, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit is legally specialized, with patent cases accounting for 63 percent of its docket and roughly 80 percent of its time.9
Technical expertise among judges, however, is minimal. At the
Federal Circuit, only five of the twelve current judges have sciencerelated degrees,10 and case assignments are not made based on
those backgrounds.11 Although it is unclear how many district
judges have technical training, they are expected to be generalists
and are not appointed for any specialized knowledge.12 Some
evidence suggests that the Federal Circuit values fact-finding from
technically trained judges, but this approach currently exists only
with the administrative judges of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board
(PTAB).13
To decide patent cases, judges must compensate for their lack of
expertise. Many Federal Circuit judges and some district judges
7. See Chad M. Oldfather, Judging, Expertise, and the Rule of Law, 89 WASH. U. L. REV.
847, 851 n.11, 853 (2012) (observing that judicial expertise can be “multi-dimensional,”
encompassing the judge’s background, subject matter expertise, judicial experience, and the
like).
8. PATENT CASES FILED BY YEAR: PAST 10 YEARS, LEXMACHINA (report on file with
author).
9. See Timothy B. Dyk, Thoughts on the Relationship Between the Supreme Court and
the Federal Circuit, 16 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 67, 77-78 (2016) (discussing how in 2016
patent litigation comprised 63 percent of the Federal Circuit’s docket and “probably on the
order of 80” percent of the court’s time).
10. See Judges, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIR., http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/
judges [https://perma.cc/FTY7-PJYV] (providing biographies for the current Federal Circuit
judges).
11. Cases are randomly assigned to a panel of three judges. See generally Court
Jurisdiction, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIR., http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/thecourt/court-jurisdiction [https://perma.cc/VR9G-LECY].
12. See Rai, supra note 2, at 1046 (observing that a “typical judge” is not a person having
“ordinary skill” in a particular art and is consequently “not likely to be endowed with the
appropriate technical knowledge”).
13. In an empirical study, Matthew Sipe observed that “the Federal Circuit appears to be
placing greater faith in the scientific expertise of its administrative patent judges” compared
to the legal specialization from courts such as the Eastern District of Texas. Matthew G. Sipe,
Experts, Generalists, Laypeople—and the Federal Circuit, 32 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 575, 578
(2019).
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hire law clerks with science or engineering degrees to provide assistance,14 and rarely, a judge will employ a neutral expert to assist
with a complex case.15 But far more frequently, party-hired experts
explain the relevant technology to judges through tutorials and
briefs, leaving judges with the responsibility of sifting through
divergent accounts.16
By contrast, several European countries utilize technically trained judges for some or all patent cases.17 In Germany, for patent
invalidation proceedings and patent office appeals, panels include
both legally qualified judges (LQJs) and technically qualified judges
(TQJs), with the TQJs hearing cases only in their area of technical
expertise.18 Switzerland relies primarily on part-time TQJs, who
also work as patent attorneys and are assigned to panels (and paid)
on a case-by-case basis.19 And if ratified, the proposed Unified

14. See Moore, supra note 5, at 18 (noting that Federal Circuit judges “generally hire law
clerks with various technical backgrounds to assist them with their cases”).
15. See infra Part II.C.
16. See infra Part II.A.
17. In addition to the courts discussed at length in this article, Denmark, Hungary, and
Sweden utilize technical judges in at least some patent litigation. See Patent Enforcement
Through the Courts in Denmark, LEXOLOGY (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.lexology.com/
library/detail.aspx?g=6c35af53-1037-4cf8-b366-c683a87022ac [https://perma.cc/5FZS-EZ3F]
(noting that, in Denmark, “two technical judges and one legally trained judge (the president)
participate in” adjudicating all patent cases); Árpád PethĞ & Eszter Szakács, Litigation and
Eligibility: Hungary, IAM (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.iam-media.com/litigation-andeligibility-hungary [https://perma.cc/2FBB-QN54] (explaining that in Hungary, the Metropolitan Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases and utilizes a “speciali[z]ed
panel” with “a legal judge ... and two technical judges”); Patent Enforcement Through the
Courts in Sweden, LEXOLOGY (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?
g=cf98c8bc-ec8d-403f-8fb3-12de0480d346 [https://perma.cc/MZC7-AVSL] (describing how, in
Sweden, patent cases are “decided by one specialist judge, assisted by technically trained
judges”). In Austria, patent infringement disputes are heard by a three-judge expert panel,
in which two judges are legal experts in patent law, and one “lay judge” is technically
qualified. Christian Gassauer-Fleissner, Dominik Göbel & Manuel Wegrostek, Patent
Litigation in Austria: Overview, THOMSON REUTERS PRAC. L. (June 1, 2020), https://uk.prac
ticallaw.thomsonreuters.com/8-621-0663 [https://perma.cc/H3M4-43FZ]. The lay judge is
typically an Austrian patent attorney with relevant technical expertise. Dominik Göbel,
Manuel Wegrostek & Paul Reiter, Patent Litigation 2020 Austria, CHAMBERS & PARTNERS
¶ 2.4 (Feb. 10, 2020), https://perma.cc/84YX-DP8Y.
18. Beate Schmidt, How to Improve the Quality of Decisions—Especially the Issue of the
Composition of the Court, in WHAT PATENT LAW FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION? 107, 110
(Christophe Geiger ed., 2012).
19. Andri Hess, Switzerland, in PATENT LITIGATION LAW REVIEW 275, 276 (Trevor Cook
ed., 3d ed. 2019), https://perma.cc/3L5Q-BGG6.
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Patent Court (UPC) would extend the use of TQJs to most of
continental Europe.20
In the current body of scholarship, much of what has been written
regarding judicial specialization in patent law has focused on legal
expertise. Several scholars, including this one, have argued that
generalized courts are beneficial and have warned about the
dangers of overspecialization in appellate patent law,21 while others
maintain that such concerns may be overblown.22 A few scholars
have called for a single specialized patent trial court.23 But little
attention has been paid to the merits of increasing technical
specialization in existing district courts.24
20. See infra Part III.A.3. Note that not all EU member states would be part of the
UPC—Spain, Croatia, and Poland have declined to join. Great Uncertainty, but Preparations
for Unitary Patent System Continue, WOLTERS KLUWER (Sept. 7, 2019),
http://patentblog.kluweriplaw.com/2019/09/07/great-uncertainty-but-preparations-for-unitarypatent-system-continue/ [https://perma.cc/YD2G-TLBG].
21. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, A Functional Approach to Judicial Review of PTAB
Rulings on Mixed Questions of Law and Fact, 104 IOWA L. REV. 2387, 2405-15 (2019)
(discussing the Federal Circuit’s inadequate deference for PTAB fact-finding); Sapna Kumar,
Patent Court Specialization, 104 IOWA L. REV. 2511, 2519-28, 2532 (2019) (observing that the
Federal Circuit’s specialization has given rise to numerous problems and arguing in favor of
granting the PTO substantive rulemaking authority to serve as a counterbalance); Wood,
supra note 1, at 9-10 (proposing an end to the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction); Rai,
supra note 2, at 1088-89 (criticizing the Federal Circuit’s lack of deference for district court
fact-finding).
22. See, e.g., J. Jonas Anderson, Reining in a “Renegade” Court: TC Heartland and the
Eastern District of Texas, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1569, 1617-18 (2018) (discussing how most
scholars do not view the Federal Circuit as being captured, but arguing that the Eastern
District of Texas has been captured); John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as “Prime
Percolator”: A Prescription for Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV.
657, 660 (2009) (“The Federal Circuit's variegated docket, the diverse backgrounds of its
judges, and its use of processes of judicial exchange whereby judges sit by designation mean
that the Circuit is significantly less specialized and isolated than commonly supposed.”).
23. See, e.g., Elizabeth Connors, Note, Specializing District Courts for Patent Litigation,
69 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 771, 802-03 (2019) (proposing a single patent trial court with technically trained law clerks); Arti K. Rai, Specialized Trial Courts: Concentrating Expertise on
Fact, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 877, 880 (2002) (maintaining that, despite the risk of capture
and tunnel vision, a single patent trial court would be superior to the current system of semispecialized trial courts); Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 932-33 (2001) (maintaining that
providing a patent trial court with exclusive jurisdiction would increase predictability of
patent law, alleviate strain on district courts, and allow the judges to develop expertise).
24. But see David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim
Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 261 (2008) (noting that
district courts could utilize judges with technical backgrounds or technical experts); Edward
V. Di Lello, Note, Fighting Fire with Firefighters: A Proposal for Expert Judges at the Trial
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This Article compares the technical expertise of U.S. judges with
those of Germany, Switzerland, and the proposed UPC. It furthermore makes several proposals for increasing technical competence
in the U.S. district courts. Part I considers the advantages and
disadvantages of specialized courts and analyzes the role that
district courts play in deciding patent cases. Part II then discusses
the use of technical expertise in the U.S. patent system and
examines how district judges educate themselves about technical
issues that arise during litigation. Part III looks at Germany,
Switzerland, and the proposed UPC’s use of TQJs and examines the
advantages and disadvantages of utilizing them.
Part IV then proposes methods of integrating greater technical
expertise into district courts, given the structure of the U.S. federal
court system. It proposes a trial in which Congress provides funds
to district courts with large patent dockets to hire magistrate judges
with technical backgrounds. It alternatively proposes that Congress
fund a trial to enable courts to hire specialized staff to assist district
judges. Finally, Part IV recommends that Congress consider
streamlining all patent litigation into a group of urban district
courts to facilitate the integration of technical expertise into the
judiciary.
I. EVALUATING JUDICIAL SPECIALIZATION
Although specialized courts existed as early as 1792,25 the U.S.
federal judiciary remains largely a generalist system.26 This is in
contrast to countries that rely heavily on specialized courts or
specialized chambers of general courts.27 Section A provides a brief
Level, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 498-99 (1993) (proposing the creation of permanent expert
magistrate judges).
25. See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Forums of the Future: The Role of Specialized Courts in
Resolving Business Disputes, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 6 (1995) (discussing the formation of
Delaware’s Chancery Court).
26. But see Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking
System, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1111-12 (1990) (discussing exceptions to the generalized U.S.
judiciary).
27. Germany, for example, has specialized courts for a variety of areas, including labor
disputes, administrative law, social security, taxation, patents, and family law. See Jochen
Lehmann, Legal Systems in Germany: Overview, THOMSON REUTERS PRAC. L. (Jan. 1, 2020),
https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/w-007-7132 [https://perma.cc/Q6N7-PWAB]
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overview of the different types of judicial specialization and discusses their advantages and disadvantages. Section B then considers district courts’ role in patent litigation and what kind of
specialization might aid judges.
A. Specialization in the Judiciary
1. Types of Specialization
Although judicial specialization and expertise are often thought
of as monolithic, this is not correct. Judges may become experts in
a particular area of legal doctrine, such as tax.28 They may become
experts in cases relating to certain classes of technology,29 such as
judges in the District of New Jersey who hear a high concentration
of pharmaceutical cases.30 They may also have specialized knowledge in policy or in dealing with particular groups of people, such as
children or drug offenders.31 Courts themselves may be specialized
independently of the judges, such as by having rules of procedure
tailored to a particular type of litigation.32 For example, the Eastern
District of Texas developed procedural rules requiring the early

(discussing the structure of the German court system). Although patent litigation cases are
heard by general regional courts, each regional court has at least one “patent chamber” that
exclusively hears patent cases. Julia Schönbohm, Bolko Ehlgen & Natalie Ackermann-Blome,
Germany, in PATENT LITIGATION LAW REVIEW, supra note 19, at 108, 110, https://perma.cc/
3L5Q-BGG6.
28. See Oldfather, supra note 7, at 852-53 (discussing how expertise may be “subjectmatter specific”).
29. See Heike Gramckow & Barry Walsh, Developing Specialized Court Services:
International Experiences and Lessons Learned 21 (World Bank Just. & Dev. Working Paper
Series, Working Paper No. 81946, 2013), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/
688441468335989050/developing-specialized-court-services-international-experiences-andlessons-learned [https://perma.cc/J2NN-DCMN] (discussing different types of judicial
specialization).
30. See Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444, 1444, 1447-48, 1500,
1506 (2010) (discussing how New Jersey has an “industry cluster” of pharmaceutical cases
and arguing that this natural clustering leads to districts that “tend to know more about the
underlying technologies and industry conditions”).
31. Gramckow & Walsh, supra note 29, at 14, 21.
32. See S. Jay Plager, The United States Courts of Appeals, the Federal Circuit, and the
Non-regional Subject Matter Concept: Reflections on the Search for a Model, 39 AM. U. L. REV.
853, 858 (1990) (arguing that courts can be specialized independently of judges).
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disclosure of infringement and invalidity contentions, which made
the forum popular with patent holders.33
Some experiments with specialization have occurred in the
United States. For example, the Court of International Trade is an
Article III court with trade-related expertise; it has exclusive
jurisdiction over all antidumping and countervailing duties disputes, along with some other international trade-related cases.34 It
is structured more like an independent agency than a court, in that
no more than five of its nine judges can be from the same political
party.35 Specialized judges also hear bankruptcy cases, but these
judges were denied Article III status to avoid “dilut[ing] the
significance, and prestige, of district judgeships.”36
With regard to patent law, Congress has looked at ways to
increase legal expertise. In 2011, Congress implemented a ten-year
Patent Pilot Program, which involved fourteen participating
courts.37 Judges serving on participating courts have the option to
decline to hear patent cases, which are then reassigned to “designated” judges who have opted into hearing more patent cases.38
Although the trial is still ongoing, initial reports have been mixed:
designated judges decided cases faster compared to nondesignated
ones, but the appeals rate and reversal rate in the Federal Circuit
have apparently stayed the same.39
33. See Megan M. La Belle, The Local Rules of Patent Procedure, 47 ARIZ. STATE L.J.
63, 99-100 (2015).
34. See Eric J. Pan, Assessing the NAFTA Chapter 19 Binational Panel System: An
Experiment in International Adjudication, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 379, 384 (1999).
35. See 28 U.S.C. § 251(a). This structure is similar to the independent International
Trade Commission, in which no more than half of the commissioners may be from the same
party. 19 U.S.C. § 1330(a).
36. See Troy A. McKenzie, Judicial Independence, Autonomy, and the Bankruptcy Courts,
62 STAN. L. REV. 747, 760-61 (2010) (quoting Bankruptcy Court Revision: Hearings on H.R.
8200 Before the Subcomm. on Civ. and Const. Rts. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th
Cong. 9 (1977) (statement of J. Simon H. Rifkind, American College of Trial Lawyers))
(discussing the formation of the bankruptcy court system).
37. Act of Jan. 4, 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-349, § 1, 124 Stat. 3674 (2011); Press Release, Off.
of the Dist. Ct. Exec. for the E. Dist. of New York, EDNY Implements Patent Pilot Program
(Feb. 7, 2012), https://img.nyed.uscourts.gov/files/local_rules/PatentPilotProject-NYEDPress
Release.pdf [https://perma.cc/E92Z-L6F2] (noting E.D.N.Y. was one of fourteen courts participating in the Patent Pilot Program).
38. § 1(a)(1)(C)-(D), (a)(3), 124 Stat. at 3674.
39. MARGARET S. WILLIAMS, REBECCA EYRE & JOE CECIL, FED. JUD. CTR., PATENT PILOT
PROGRAM: FIVE-YEAR REPORT 1, 22-23, 35-36 (2016), https://www.fjc.gov/content/316142/
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Congress has made some effort to increase technical expertise in
patent cases. Under the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), it
created the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) to facilitate
validity challenges.40 The Board’s Administrative Patent Judges are
required to “be persons of competent legal knowledge and scientific
ability.”41 However, although an effort is made to ensure that each
three-judge panel has at least one judge in the relevant technical
field,42 this is not always the case.43 With regard to increasing
technical expertise in the courts, Congress has not passed any
legislation. Although the House bill for the Patent Pilot Program
called for funding to train judges and employ law clerks with
technical backgrounds, these provisions were cut prior to passage.44
2. Benefits and Risks of Specialization
Judicial specialization provides several advantages. As judges
accumulate experience from deciding cases in a single subject area,
they become more efficient and potentially increase the quality and
accuracy of their decision-making.45 Because they gain a better
patent-pilot-program-five-year-report [https://perma.cc/PV9D-EQSC] (noting that although
designated judges decide patent cases faster compared to nondesignated judges, the appeal
rate seems to be the same between the two groups); Amy Semet, Specialized Trial Courts in
Patent Litigation: A Review of the Patent Pilot Program’s Impact on Appellate Reversal Rates
at the Five-Year Mark, 60 B.C. L. REV. 519, 571 (2019) (“[L]ittle difference exists in appellate
court treatment based on the specialization of the judge.”).
40. See Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 2389 (observing that Congress created the PTAB “to
provide a quicker, cheaper, and more expert alternative to federal district courts for
adjudicating validity challenges”).
41. 35 U.S.C. § 6(a).
42. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Giving the Federal Circuit a Run for Its Money: Challenging
Patents in the PTAB, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 235, 240 (2015).
43. See Charles W. Shifley, “Your PTAB Judges Will Be Experts”—Right? ... Not So Fast,
BANNER & WITCOFF (July 26, 2016), https://bannerwitcoff.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/
ALERT-PTAB-Highlights.Shifley.07.26.2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/X9KP-G7SE] (discussing
cases that contained judges with no relevant technical background).
44. Compare H.R. 628, 111th Cong. § f(1) (2011), with Act of Jan. 4, 2011, Pub. L. No. 111349, § 1, 124 Stat. 3674.
45. See Oldfather, supra note 7, at 856 (observing that scholars suggest that specialized
judges “will possess a more comprehensive understanding of the complex legal machinery
governing a subject, and will consequently be better able to tinker with that machinery in
ways that will improve its performance”); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication,
1990 BYU L. REV. 377, 378 (noting that if “experts are better than laymen at dealing with
matters in their special areas, the specialized judiciary should handle cases more efficiently,
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understanding of the applicable legal doctrines, their opinions may
become more uniform and predictable than their generalist counterparts.46 Specialized judges may also have a firmer grasp of
complex facts underpinning a dispute.47 This is particularly true, in
the case of patent law, for judges who possess a relevant technical
background.48
However, the benefits of specialization are accompanied by
related risks. Like administrative agencies, specialized courts may
be vulnerable to capture by interest groups, due to the concentration
of similar cases leading to repeat encounters with the specialized
bar that brings the cases before the court.49 A greater risk of
politicization exists as well.50 Interest groups will focus their
lobbying efforts to have judges appointed who represent their
interests, which may taint the appointments process.51 The popularity of specialized courts with litigants may, moreover, be due to
their bias rather than their quality.52
Prior work experience can also impact the outcome of cases. For
example, in the context of immigration law, a group of scholars
found that judges with prior work experience at the Department of
Homeland Security or Immigration and Naturalization Service
granted only 38.9 percent of asylum cases, compared to 48.2 percent
thereby reducing the number of judge-hours required to decide any given number of cases”).
46. LAWRENCE BAUM, SPECIALIZING THE COURTS 218 (2011) (noting how specialization
may lead to “greater uniformity of legal doctrine”).
47. See Revesz, supra note 26, at 1117-18.
48. See Oldfather, supra note 7, at 856.
49. See Anderson, supra note 22, at 1618 (arguing that the “[c]oncentration of cases makes
judges more capture-prone, or at least more likely to be targeted for capture”); Dreyfuss, supra
note 45, at 380 (discussing the risk of capture); Diane P. Wood, Generalist Judges in a
Specialized World, 50 SMU L. REV. 1755, 1767-68 (1997) (discussing “powerful arguments”
against specialization, including the decreased risk of regulatory capture, the crossfertilization of ideas, and the commonalities of all areas of law).
50. See Dreyfuss, supra note 45, at 379.
51. See id. at 379-80 (observing that it is much easier for interest groups to capture a
single specialized court compared to numerous general courts); BAUM, supra note 46, at 221
(observing how the selection of specialized judges can be skewed to those who have “a
particular policy orientation”).
52. For example, the popularity of the Eastern District of Texas for patent litigation was
more likely for the pro-patent bias of both the court and the juries than for the quality and
accuracy of its decisions. See Ana Santos Rutschman, Patent Venue Exceptionalism After TC
Heartland v. Kraft, 25 U. MIA. BUS. L. REV. 29, 36-37 (2017) (discussing how the convergence
of “pro-plaintiff factors” made the Eastern District of Texas the most popular patent forum).
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from judges with other backgrounds.53 Similarly, judges with
military backgrounds were 18 percent less likely to grant asylum
than those without.54 This means that when Congress specializes
courts, it must consider how that could impact the background of
the people who get appointed as judges and how that might alter the
court’s jurisprudence.
Furthermore, specialized courts can become highly insular. As
Judge Simon Rifkind noted, if one isolates patent law, it will
eventually “develop[ ] a jargon of its own, thought-patterns that are
unique, internal policies which it subserves and which are different
from and sometimes at odds with the policies pursued by the
general law.”55 A generalist familiar with many areas of law may be
able to better contextualize a seemingly unique case.56
Because of these potential drawbacks, it is important to move
cautiously with any plan to increase judicial specialization and to
ensure that the benefits outweigh the risks.57 One must also
consider what kind of specialization would best aid the judiciary.
For these reasons, trials like the Patent Pilot Program represent a
good way to generate data and evaluate the merits of different
proposals.58

53. Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette:
Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 345-46 (2007).
54. Id. at 346.
55. Simon Rifkind, A Special Court for Patent Litigation? The Danger of a Specialized
Judiciary, 37 A.B.A. J. 425, 425 (1951). Judge Rifkind’s fears have arguably come to pass, as
the Federal Circuit’s case law drifted away from mainstream administrative law that is
supposed to govern all federal agencies. See generally Sapna Kumar, The Accidental Agency?,
65 FLA. L. REV. 229 (2013) (discussing how the Federal Circuit has routinely disregarded basic
principles of administrative law over the years).
56. See Oldfather, supra note 7, at 863 (observing that a generalist may have “the virtue
of being able to cut through the seeming uniqueness of any given new situation” and recognize
that the case at hand “is ultimately just another variation on a familiar theme”).
57. See David B. Rottman, Does Effective Therapeutic Jurisprudence Require Specialized
Courts (and Do Specialized Courts Imply Specialist Judges)?, 37 CT. REV. 22, 24-25 (2000)
(noting that because specialized courts are the exception, the burden of proof for showing its
benefits outweigh the costs lies with its proponents).
58. See, e.g., WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 39, at 38-39.
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B. The Role of Generalist District Courts in Patent Litigation
District judges generally serve two primary roles. First, they
declare what the law is, both through creating new legal standards
and modifying existing ones.59 In doing so, they help alter people’s
behavior by sanctioning certain acts.60 Second, district judges
resolve disputes between private parties.61 They play a far greater
role in dispute resolution than appellate judges because they handle
the overwhelming majority of U.S. cases.62 Beyond presiding over
trials, district judges also help facilitate settlement.63 The onset of
litigation can precipitate “bargaining in the shadow of the law,” with
judges signaling to lawyers to craft out-of-court resolutions to their
disputes.64 Judges can help the parties form settlement agreements,65 sometimes facilitated by magistrate judges with expertise
in mediation.66
59. See Oldfather, supra note 7, at 868 (noting one purpose of trial courts “is the creation
and refinement of legal standards—the law declaration role”).
60. See Kenneth E. Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process, 27 STAN. L. REV. 937, 938
(1975) (noting that under a “Behavior Modification Model,” courts provide a method “of
altering behavior by imposing costs on a person”).
61. See Oldfather, supra note 7, at 868 (observing that the two roles of trial courts are
private dispute resolution and declaring what the law is); Scott, supra note 60, at 937
(discussing that under the “Conflict Resolution Model” of the civil process, the primary role
of civil process is to settle disputes between private parties).
62. See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench:
How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4 (2007).
63. See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 379-80 (1982)
(discussing how trial judges engage in “informal dispute resolution and ... case management”).
64. See Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years War, 57
STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1264 (2005) (noting that “[t]he promise of full-blown adjudication in a
public forum” has been “increasingly redeemed by ‘bargaining in the shadow of the law’”
(citation omitted)).
65. See Sandra S. Beckwith, District Court Mediation Programs: A View from the Bench,
26 OHIO STATE J. ON DISP. RESOL. 357, 357-58 (2011) (discussing different approaches taken
by district courts to encourage mediation); Francis E. McGovern, Toward a Functional Approach for Managing Complex Litigation, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 440, 442 (1986) (noting that
although the “classic model” had judges playing a passive role in dispute resolution, the newer
model suggests that “judges should actively intervene in the administration of justice”);
Resnik, supra note 63, at 380 (discussing how trial judges engage in “informal dispute
resolution and case management”).
66. For example, the District of Delaware uses magistrate judges trained in mediation to
assist with alternative dispute resolution. See, e.g., Chief Magistrate Judge Mary Pat Thynge,
U.S. DIST. CT. DIST. OF DEL., https://www.ded.uscourts.gov/judge/chief-magistrate-judge-marypat-thynge [https://perma.cc/8P48-BYVV].
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In the context of patent law, the district court’s role is slightly
altered, because its function of declaring what constitutes patent
law is not as important compared to other substantive areas. The
Federal Circuit has a congressional mandate to provide uniformity
in patent law and, for better or for worse, is the primary interpreter
of the Patent Act.67 Because nearly two-thirds of the Federal
Circuit’s docket is patent related,68 district courts have access to
clarifications of many issues arising in substantive patent law.
One can therefore argue that the availability of Federal Circuit
precedent to guide lower courts on substantive patent law factors
against a need for legal specialization.69 Although district judges
must deal with patent issues of first impression, the Federal Circuit
can engage in error correction through appellate review.70 There are
admittedly some issues that hinder this: district judges do not
generally follow Federal Circuit case law and must invest time in
learning about relevant patent cases,71 and the Federal Circuit has
been criticized both for the lack of clarity in various patent doctrines,72 and for its unwillingness to resolve conflicting decisions
through rehearing cases en banc.73 Nevertheless, some argue that
67. See Kumar, supra note 55, at 231, 243-44 (discussing the Federal Circuit’s
congressional mandate to unify patent law and serve as the administrator of the Patent Act).
68. Dyk, supra note 9, at 77.
69. See id. (noting the high percentage of patent cases on the Federal Circuit’s docket);
Kumar, supra note 55, at 231 (observing the emergence of “bright-line rules” that helped unify
patent law and clarify legal issues).
70. See Kumar, supra note 55, at 232 (noting that the Federal Circuit reviews almost all
patent appeals).
71. See Holderman, supra note 2, at 429 (observing that Northern District of Illinois
judges receive slip opinions from the Seventh Circuit, but not from the Federal Circuit, and
that “only when a patent case comes our way do we brush up on the latest developments in
the law”).
72. See, e.g., Bernard Chao, Patent Law’s Domestic Sales Trap, 93 DENV. L. REV. ONLINE
87, 89 (2016), https://www.denverlawreview.org/dlr-online-article/2016/4/6/patent-laws-domes
tic-sales-trap.html [https://perma.cc/W5WQ-S8BG] (discussing the confusing line of precedent
regarding whether a sale took place in the United States and is therefore subject to the U.S.
Patent Act); Rebecca K. Stewart, Weeds, Seeds & Deeds Redux: Natural and Legal Evolution
in the U.S. Seed Wars, 18 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 79, 117-18 (2014) (discussing how the Federal
Circuit’s case law regarding utility patent protection for seeds contains substantial
ambiguities).
73. See Paul Michel & John Battaglia, On Claim Construction, Predictability, and Patent
Law Consistency: The Federal Circuit Needs to Vote En Banc, IP WATCHDOG (Feb. 3, 2020),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2020/02/03/claim-construction-predictability-patent-lawconsistency-federal-circuit-needs-vote-en-banc/id=118481/ [https://perma.cc/GY4X-7YYF]
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given time, generalist judges should be able to understand existing
patent precedent.74
However, district courts are crucial in resolving private patent
disputes, and to do so accurately, they must understand the
technology that underlies the claims at issue.75 Take, for example,
Markman hearings, which are pretrial hearings during which the
judge determines the proper meaning for the patent claims that are
at issue.76 As Judge Mayer noted in his dissent in Phillips v. AWH
Corp., during the hearing:
[P]arties battle over experts offering conflicting evidence
regarding who qualifies as one of ordinary skill in the art; the
meaning of patent terms to that person; the state of the art at
the time of the invention; contradictory dictionary definitions
and which would be consulted by the skilled artisan; the scope
of specialized terms; the problem a patent was solving; what is
related or pertinent art; whether a construction was disallowed
during prosecution; how one of skill in the art would understand
statements during prosecution; and on and on.77

Claim construction requires judges “to sift through and weigh
volumes of evidence” and determine how a person having ordinary
skill in the art would interpret the language78—something that is
not possible if the judge does not understand the technology at
issue.79
District judges tend to be generalists who are expected to handle
a wide range of legal issues.80 A few judges hear a high volume of
(maintaining that the Federal Circuit “needs to go en banc more” to help address unresolved
and unpredictable precedent).
74. See Wood, supra note 1, at 7 (maintaining that “the basic legal principles” of patent
law “are relatively straightforward”).
75. See Fromer, supra note 6, at 314-15 (discussing how district judges must understand
underlying technology to make many determinations in patent cases).
76. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 378, 388-90 (1996) (holding
that although claim construction is a hybrid question of law and fact, judges should construe
claim language).
77. 415 F.3d 1303, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Mayer, J., dissenting).
78. Id.
79. See Schwartz, supra note 24, at 260 (“A judge needs to understand the core technology
to interpret claim terms properly.”); Fromer, supra note 6, at 314 (discussing how judges must
understand underlying technology to construe claims).
80. See James F. Holderman & Halley Guren, The Patent Litigation Predicament in the
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patent cases and become legally specialized,81 but technical backgrounds appear to be uncommon.82 It is therefore not surprising
that some judges dislike patent cases and feel overwhelmed by
their patent docket.83 As Judge Patti Saris of the District of Massachusetts observed: “A lot of my colleagues hate patent cases. Hate
them. They say, ‘I tell you what, if you do my patent case, I’ll do five
ERISA cases.’”84 As Judge Saris further noted, the high reversal
rate from Federal Circuit review “demoralizes” many district
judges.85 Prior to joining the Federal Circuit, Judge Kimberly Moore
questioned why “district court judges conduct trials and decide complex issues of patent infringement and validity based on their claim
constructions” when they are reversed in one in three cases.86
Admittedly, the lack of technical expertise is not the only
impediment to accurate claim construction. As Judge Paul Michel
and John Battaglia have noted, there is a split on major claim
construction canons dating back several decades.87 The Federal
Circuit’s inexplicable reticence to address this issue en banc makes
the job of district court judges that much harder.88 But the Federal
United States, 2007 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 1, 5 (discussing the generalist nature of district
court judges).
81. For example, between 2011 and 2017, Judge Gilstrap handled more than four
thousand patent infringement lawsuits. Nushin Huq, Rural Texas Judge Runs Busiest Patent
Court in U.S., BLOOMBERG L. (Apr. 20, 2017, 10:24 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/uslaw-week/rural-texas-judge-runs-busiest-patent-court-in-us [https://perma.cc/8PVL-LKE7].
Though, as Judge O’Malley has observed, even judges who hear patent cases can make
mistakes because they do not realize how the law has evolved. O’Malley et al., supra note 1,
at 683; see also Mark A. Lemley, Su Li & Jennifer M. Urban, Does Familiarity Breed
Contempt Among Judges Deciding Patent Cases?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1121, 1137 (2014) (listing
judges who decided ten or more substantive patent cases between 2001 and 2010).
82. It is difficult to ascertain precisely how many judges have technical backgrounds,
given the lack of availability of public data. See Lemley et al., supra note 81, at 1153
(discussing the difficulty in ascertaining whether district court judges possess technical
backgrounds).
83. See O’Malley et al., supra note 1, at 682 (“I have heard trial judges claim that they
dislike patent litigation, partly because it is hard.” (remarks of Hon. Patti Saris)); Holderman,
supra note 2, at 428 (observing that many of Judge Holderman’s colleagues do not enjoy
patent cases); see also Moore, supra note 23, at 933 (“[Patent suits] are among the most
complex cases on [district courts’] dockets.”).
84. O’Malley et al., supra note 1, at 683 n.31 (remarks of Hon. Patti Saris).
85. Id. at 682.
86. Moore, supra note 5, at 31.
87. Michel & Battaglia, supra note 73.
88. See id.
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Circuit’s problems aside, the lack of technical expertise in district
courts contributes to the problem by making judges highly dependent on outside experts to educate them.89 As Part II discusses, such
experts come with drawbacks.
II. TECHNICAL EXPERTISE OF U.S. JUDGES
Technical expertise is largely lacking in the U.S. judiciary.
Congress has considered ways to improve judges’ legal skills in
patent cases through the Patent Pilot Program, which allows judges
in participating courts to opt in or out of hearing patent cases.90 But
Congress has made no attempt to integrate greater technical
expertise into the judiciary. Moreover, the Federal Circuit has
cautioned district judges against regularly using technical advisors,
fearing that experts could unduly influence court proceedings.91
Consequently, district judges remain dependent on party-hired
experts for learning case-related technology.
Section A examines district judges’ use of party-hired experts in
patent cases and considers drawbacks to this practice. Section B
then discusses how law clerks may be employed to serve as quasiexperts to judges. Section C looks at how judges use neutral experts,
such as technical advisors, and discusses limitations that prevent
such experts from being used more broadly.
A. Party-Hired Experts
To accurately construe the patent claims at issue in a particular
case, district judges must first grasp the relevant technology. But
intrinsic evidence from the patent application is not always
conclusive, leading district judges to rely upon technical information
provided by the parties.92 Party-created tutorials provide an
89. See infra Part II.
90. See Semet, supra note 39, at 539-40.
91. See also TechSearch, L.L.C. v. Intel Corp., 286 F.3d 1360, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(citing Ass’n of Mexican-Am. Educators v. California, 231 F.3d 572, 590-91 (9th Cir. 2000))
(noting that technical advisors should seldom be used and only in exceptional cases).
92. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[E]xtrinsic evidence
in the form of expert testimony can be useful to a court for a variety of purposes, such as to
provide background on the technology at issue.”).
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overview of relevant scientific concepts and serve as a crucial source
of information for judges who lack technically trained law clerks or
neutral experts.93 Prior to the Markman hearing, party experts will
usually prepare competing reports regarding the proper meaning of
the relevant terms, and during the hearing, a judge will hear from
both sides to help determine the proper claim construction.94 In this
“battle of the experts,” the judge is forced into the difficult position
of evaluating biased scientific evidence in an attempt to discern
what is true.95
There is an open question with regard to whether judges can
adequately sift evidence to construe claims and, more generally,
serve as an adequate gatekeeper to scientific evidence.96 The en
banc Federal Circuit in Phillips v. AWH Corp. noted that district
judges have “discretion to admit and use” extrinsic evidence, but
“should keep in mind the flaws inherent in each type of evidence
and assess that evidence accordingly.”97 In Daubert v. Merrell Dow

93. See Judges Discuss Best Practices in Patent Law, TEX. LAW. (June 3, 2013) (discussing
Judge Lynn’s reliance on tutorials, given the lack of available technically trained law clerks).
94. See Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron Deference
for the PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959, 2009 (2013). With regard to Markman hearings,
District Judge Reed O’Connor noted, “I don’t have an engineering background, and so for me
it’s very helpful to have that to be prepared ahead of time to go in there and then to listen to
both sides address the issues and argue their points.” Judges Discuss Best Practices in Patent
Law, supra note 93.
95. See Wasserman, supra note 94, at 2009 (discussing how party-provided scientific and
technical information is of diminished value); Michael J. Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1747, 1786 (2011) (observing that party-presented evidence is “prone to bias”);
Rai, supra note 23, at 892 (“‘Battles of the experts’ ... are likely to shed more heat than light.”).
There are other options to help facilitate the use of party-hired experts. Australian courts
routinely use the “hot tub” method of expert testimony, in which experts give their evidence
on a particular point at the same time, with the judge taking an active role in questioning
them. See Steven Rares, Using the “Hot Tub,” FED. CT. OF AUSTL. (Oct. 12, 2013), https://www.
fedcourt.gov.au/digital-law-library/judges-speeches/justice-rares/rares-j-20131012
[https://perma.cc/GKW7-A5JY]; Alexander Canale & Peter Munro, Experts in a Hot Tub—
Testifying Concurrently as an Expert Witness, ALVAREZ & MARSAL (Oct. 24, 2019), https://
www.alvarezandmarsal.com/insights/experts-hot-tub-testifying-concurrently-expert-witness
[https://perma.cc/9Y47-NSXQ].
96. See Xavier Seuba, Scientific Complexity and Patent Adjudication: The Technical
Judges of the Unified Patent Court, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE JUDICIARY 265, 265
(Christophe Geiger et al. eds., 2018) (observing that the role of gatekeeper “may become easily
confused with that other role of ‘amateur scientist[ ]’” and that judges face difficulties because
of their lack of knowledge).
97. 415 F.3d at 1319.
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Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Supreme Court tasked district courts
with ensuring that only “good” science reaches the jury.98
Yet, judges who possess neither technical training nor neutral
advisors are arguably ill-equipped to make such decisions.99 In a
concurrence, Justice Breyer maintained that the Daubert requirements “will sometimes ask judges to make subtle and sophisticated
determinations” regarding “scientific methodology and its relation
to the conclusions an expert witness seeks to offer.”100 He observed
that “judges are not scientists and do not have the scientific training
that can facilitate the making of such decisions.”101 Judge James
Holderman and Halley Guren have noted that without having that
technical background, district judges are far more likely to draw the
wrong conclusion than they would “if the factual premises underlying the factual basis of the dispute had a familiar ring” based on
their education or experience.102 It is also possible that judges will
evaluate the expert evidence merely on the credentials and demeanor of the experts.103
One potential problem with altering this system is the concern
that it might undermine the adversarial system. But as Arti Rai has
observed, in technically complex patent litigation, “reducing the
adversarial component may be a virtue rather than a vice,” given
that expert witnesses “are likely to shed more heat than light.”104
Moreover, a judge’s ability to gain an accurate understanding of the
relevant technology through experts requires that both parties be
well-funded. Judge Posner noted that “[i]t is heartless” for courts “to
make a fetish of adversary procedure” if “the opponent has no
98. 509 U.S. 579, 590, 597 (1993) (noting that scientific testimony “must be supported by
appropriate validation—i.e., ‘good grounds,’ based on what is known” and that judges serve
as the gatekeepers).
99. See Edward K. Cheng, Independent Judicial Research in the Daubert Age, 56 DUKE
L.J. 1263, 1266 (2007) (observing that judges are generally unfamiliar with specialized
scientific information and lack the requisite background to assess reliability); Scott Brewer,
Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107 YALE L.J. 1535, 1618 (1998)
(discussing the inadequacy of forcing nonexperts to sort biased scientific evidence).
100. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 147 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring).
101. Id. at 148.
102. See Holderman & Guren, supra note 80, at 6.
103. Brewer, supra note 99, at 1618 (“[I]t seems likely that many judges would be led to
convert what is on the surface a substantive inquiry by nonexpert judges—as directed by
Daubert—into a form of deference based on demeanor and credentials.”).
104. Rai, supra note 23, at 892.

2021]

JUDGING PATENTS

891

practical access to offsetting evidence,” leading to “feeble evidence”
being used instead.105 If a well-funded patent holder sues a small
business or an individual, the party-expert system of providing
technical information to the judge is unlikely to work, if such a case
ever even makes it to trial.106
The U.S. system of district judges relying almost exclusively on
partisan experts is, overall, deeply troubling. At their worst, expert
reports for Markman hearings are authored by the attorneys,107 and
expert witnesses will merely parrot what the attorneys want them
to say.108 The Federal Circuit has observed that “expert reports and
testimony [are] generated at the time of and for the purpose of
litigation” and consequently, may “suffer from bias that is not
present in intrinsic evidence.”109 It recognized that “each party will
naturally choose the pieces of extrinsic evidence most favorable to
its cause,” thereby forcing the district judge to “filter[ ] the useful
extrinsic evidence from the fluff.”110 Such a task may be beyond a
typical judge’s ability.

105. Rowe v. Gibson, 798 F.3d 622, 630 (7th Cir. 2015); see also Allison Orr Larsen,
Judicial Factfinding in an Age of Rapid Change: Creative Reforms from Abroad, 130 HARV.
L. REV. 316, 316-17 (2017) (discussing the difficulty of balancing judges relying on “unsubstantiated claims” that have not gone through the adversarial process versus relying on partysupplied information when there are “lopsided” resources).
106. See Kathleen Kim, Legal Research Site Names 2,000 Patent Trolls, INC. (Dec. 21,
2012), https://www.inc.com/kathleen-kim/exposed-names-of-patent-trolls-revealed.hmtl.html
[https://perma.cc/MH63-UAE2] (discussing how nonpracticing patent holding companies sue
small companies for patent infringement, often forcing these companies to settle).
107. Although the Federal Circuit does not appear to have opined on this issue, several
district courts have held that attorneys may assist in the drafting of expert reports, so long
as the substance is from the expert. See Seitz v. Envirotech Sys. Worldwide Inc., No. H-024782, 2008 WL 656513, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 2008). Courts vary on what the remedy is if
the attorney does contribute substance to the expert report. See Michael Lowry, Can an
Attorney Prepare the Expert’s Report? Part 2, COMPELLING DISCOVERY (Oct. 5, 2015),
https://www.compellingdiscovery.com/?p=3128 [https://perma.cc/Y88F-57ML] (noting that
some courts will find an attorney-drafted report admissible but give it less weight, while
others will conclude it violates Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26’s requirement that the
expert prepare the report).
108. See John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV.
823, 835 (1985) (discussing experts as “saxophones,” in which “the lawyer plays the tune,
manipulating the expert as though the expert were a musical instrument”).
109. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
110. Id.
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B. Law Clerks
One way that judges compensate for their lack of technical
expertise is by hiring law clerks with technical backgrounds.111 In
the past, there has been some effort to expand funding for technically trained clerks as part of broader patent reform, though no such
legislation has ever passed.112
From a judge’s perspective, using clerks as experts has some
advantages. Judges need not disclose to the parties the conversations that they had with their clerks.113 Judges already have a
budget to hire them, so there is no additional cost to the court or to
the parties, and clerks are cheap compared to full-fledged experts.114
Additionally, clerks generally work in the same office as judges,
making it easy for judges to ask them questions about technology.115
However, relying on law clerks for technical expertise comes with
several disadvantages. District judges have only two or three clerks,

111. See Moore, supra note 5, at 18. It is difficult to assess what percentage of Federal
Circuit and district court clerks have technical backgrounds, given that this information is
not generally publicly released. Justice Breyer suggested that judges utilize “specially trained
law clerks” to compensate for their lack of scientific expertise. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522
U.S. 136, 149 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring).
112. See C. Erik Hawes & James Beebe, H.R. 5418 and Specialized ‘Patent Courts’: The
Latest Congressional Effort at Patent Reform, IPL NEWSL. A.B.A., Winter 2007, at 18
(discussing H.R. 5418’s provision that would have provided $5 million a year for judicial
training of designated patent judges and law clerks “with expertise in technical matters
arising in patent and plant variety protection cases”).
113. See Todd C. Peppers, Micheal W. Giles & Bridget Tainer-Parkins, Inside Judicial
Chambers: How Federal District Court Judges Select and Use Their Law Clerks, 71 ALB. L.
REV. 623, 636 (2008); see also Mitu Gulati & Richard A. Posner, The Management of Staff by
Federal Court of Appeals Judges, 69 VAND. L. REV. 479, 485 (2016).
114. See Mira Gur-Arie, Senior Attorney, Fed. Jud. Ctr., Legal and Court Staff in the
United States Judiciary, Presentation at the Seminar on the Management of the Assistant
Personnel to Judges at 5 (Nov. 22-26, 2004), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/
StaffEng.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JD3-YYWD]. Law clerks are paid at Judicial Salary Plan
(JSP) 11, step 1 to JSP 13, step 1, depending on their experience. Qualifications, Salary, and
Benefits, OSCAR (Feb. 1, 2018), https://oscar.uscourts.gov/qualifications_salary_benefits#
salary [https://perma.cc/TPS4-GTLX]. This can result in a law clerk base pay rate as low as
$55,204 a year for JSP 11-1. See Judiciary Salary Plan Base Pay Rates, U.S. CTS. (Jan. 6,
2020), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2020/jsp_base_pay_rates_table_00_2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AQV7-TEN9].
115. See Donald W. Molloy, Designated Hitters, Pinch Hitters, and Bat Boys: Judges
Dealing with Judgment and Inexperience, Career Clerks or Term Clerks, 82 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 133, 137 (2019).
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and Federal Circuit judges have three or four.116 This means that no
judge will be able to cover all areas of technology with clerks alone.
Moreover, only so many law school graduates have technical
degrees, relevant work experience, and strong legal credentials.117
Clerks typically serve only one to two years, meaning that judges
must constantly search for new ones.118 Technically trained clerks
might also be less knowledgeable in other areas of law that are
relevant to the court’s docket, such as criminal law. For a judge who
hears patent cases sporadically, hiring one or more specialized
clerks may not make sense.
More troubling is the lack of transparency and oversight with
regard to judges’ use of clerks. If a judge utilizes a neutral expert,
parties can generally raise objections regarding the expert’s
qualifications.119 By contrast, judges control whom they hire for
clerkships, and such clerks may lack sufficient skills to be adequate
technical advisors.120 Furthermore, there is no indication in a
judicial opinion regarding which information is coming from the
clerk. Judicial abdication is already a general concern with regard
to judges’ use of clerks,121 and the risk is far greater when relying on
them for knowledge that the judge does not possess.
C. Court-Appointed Experts and Advisors
In the 1920 case Ex parte Peterson, the Supreme Court held
that “[c]ourts have ... inherent power to provide themselves with
116. The exact number of law clerks a judge gets depends on whether the judge has a
secretary. See Gur-Arie, supra note 114, at 6 (observing that although appellate court judges
have three clerks and district court judges have two clerks, judges may choose to forgo an
administrative assistant to receive one additional clerk).
117. See Judges Discuss Best Practices in Patent Law, supra note 93 (remarks of Hon.
Barbara Lynn) (discussing the lack of available law clerks with engineering backgrounds in
the Northern District of Texas).
118. Gur-Arie, supra note 114, at 5. Some district judges do utilize career clerks, but the
Judicial Conference has made it harder for judges to keep clerks for more than four years. See
Molloy, supra note 115, at 141.
119. See FED. R. EVID. 706(a)-(b).
120. See Judges Discuss Best Practices in Patent Law, supra note 93 (remarks of Hon.
Barbara Lynn) (describing the difficulties of finding clerks with applicable technical backgrounds).
121. Molloy, supra note 115, at 149-50 (discussing district judges’ concern about judicial
abdication with regard to the use of both term and permanent law clerks).
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appropriate instruments required for the performance of their
duties.”122 This gives judges “authority to appoint persons unconnected with the court to aid judges in the performance of specific
judicial duties.”123 In Justice Breyer’s concurrence in General
Electric Co. v. Joiner, he supported the idea of judges using this
authority to hire neutral experts.124 However, district courts rarely
utilize technical advisors, neutral testifying experts, or special
masters in patent cases.125 This is due to a variety of concerns,
including restrictions from the Federal Circuit and a fear that the
expert will usurp the role of the judge or the jury.
1. Technical Advisors
Technical advisors are not court-appointed expert witnesses,126
but instead provide support to the judge out of sight of the parties
and the jury.127 As the First Circuit observed, their “role is to act as
a sounding board for the judge” by helping the judge learn “the
jargon and theory disclosed by the testimony” and assisting the
judge in “think[ing] through the critical technical problems.”128
Their role is analogous to that of scientific advisors used by courts
in the United Kingdom.129
122. 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920).
123. Id.
124. See 522 U.S. 136, 149-50 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring) (agreeing with the New
England Journal of Medicine amicus brief that judges should use their inherent powers to
seek help from scientists in fulfilling their gatekeeper function).
125. See Joshua R. Nightingale, An Empirical Study on the Use of Technical Advisors in
Patent Cases, 93 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 400, 409-11 (2011) (observing that the use
of court-appointed experts, special masters, and technical advisors is rare).
126. Because technical advisors are not court-appointed expert witnesses, their
appointment is not subject to the requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 706. TechSearch
L.L.C. v. Intel Corp., 286 F.3d 1360, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Rule 706 applies to expert
witnesses, but not to technical advisors.”).
127. See Nightingale, supra note 125, at 414-15 (noting that a technical advisor’s “duty is
generally fulfilled through off-the-record, ex parte communications with the judge”).
128. Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149, 158 (1st Cir. 1988).
129. See Halliburton Energy Servs. Inc. v. Smith Int’l (N. Sea) Ltd. [2006] EWCA (Civ)
1599, [26], http://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/format.cgi?doc=/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2006/1599.html
[https://perma.cc/WM2X-3G8Q] (observing that the role of scientific advisors in the United
Kingdom is “to help us understand that evidence, to help us consider whether the judge fully
understood that evidence, and to help us evaluate the conclusions which the judge reached
on that evidence”); Kirwin Lee, On the Role of Scientific Advisers: Transparency and
Expectations, PATLIT (May 4, 2016), http://patlit.blogspot.com/2016/05/on-role-of-scientific-
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In TechSearch L.L.C. v. Intel Corp., the Federal Circuit addressed
the use of technical advisors.130 The case involved complex microprocessor technology, leading the district judge to appoint a technical
advisor to assist in understanding technology related to pretrial
motions and trial proceedings.131 The expert promised to not conduct
any independent investigation, contact the parties, or provide any
evidence to the judge.132
Although the Federal Circuit ultimately affirmed the judge’s use
of an advisor, it created obstacles to future uses.133 The Federal
Circuit maintained that the issue of court-appointed advisors is
procedural and thereby subject to regional case law—in this case,
from the Ninth Circuit.134 It claimed that the Ninth Circuit in its en
banc decision Ass’n of Mexican-American Educators v. California
(AMAE) “implicitly recognized that district courts should use this
inherent authority sparingly and then only in exceptionally
technically complicated cases.”135
The Federal Circuit then attempted to predict what procedural
limitations the Ninth Circuit would employ “for minimally safeguarding the judicial process and the district court from undue
influence by the technical advisor,” and to ensure that the advisors
are used merely as tutors and providers of technical and background information.136 The Federal Circuit inexplicably chose to
follow Ninth Circuit Judge Tashima’s dissenting AMAE opinion,
holding that district courts must
use a “fair and open procedure for appointing a neutral technical
advisor ... addressing any allegations of bias, partiality or lack
of qualifications” in the candidates; clearly define and limit the
technical advisor’s duties, presumably in a writing disclosed to
all parties; guard against extra-record information; and make
advisers.html [https://perma.cc/Q348-2U9F] (discussing how seldomly used scientific advisors
help United Kingdom judges learn unfamiliar technology and terminology).
130. 286 F.3d at 1376-81.
131. Id. at 1368-69.
132. Id. at 1369.
133. Id. at 1377-80.
134. Id. at 1376-77.
135. Id. at 1378 (citing Ass’n of Mexican-Am. Educators v. California, 231 F.3d 572, 590-91
(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)).
136. Id. at 1378-79.
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explicit, perhaps through a report or record, the nature and
content of the technical advisor’s tutelage concerning the
technology.137

The Federal Circuit then went one step further than the AMAE
dissent, maintaining that even if these guidelines permit the judge
to use a technical advisor, it “does not mean that it is invariably
desirable or that safeguards are not required.”138 The Federal
Circuit also claimed that “district court judges need to be extremely
sensitive” to the “risk that some of the judicial decision-making
function will be delegated to the technical advisor” and take steps
to “minimize the potential for its occurrence.”139 It suggested that
courts should apply hard-look review to a judge’s decision to use an
advisor to ensure that the advisor is not actually deciding factual
issues.140 Quoting Judge Tashima’s AMAE dissent, the Federal
Circuit stated that although judges “can filter out ‘bad’ legal advice
or research from a law clerk,” judges are “ill-equipped” to do the
same from technical advisors.141
The Federal Circuit’s concern about judges’ overreliance on
neutral experts is not wholly without merit. As discussed below, one
of the reasons Switzerland created the Swiss Federal Patent Court
was because some canton judges were rubber-stamping the opinions of court-appointed experts, no matter how flawed they were.142
The fact that the Swiss judges in certain cantons heard so few
patent cases is believed to have contributed to an improper overreliance on expert opinions.143 U.S. judges have wide leeway in selecting neutral experts, whether technical advisors or special
masters.144 This raises concerns that they might rely on information
137. Id. at 1379 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Ass’n of Mexican-Am.
Educators, 231 F.3d at 611 (Tashima, J., dissenting)).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1379 n.6.
141. Id. (quoting Ass’n of Mexican-Am. Educators, 231 F.3d at 614 (Tashima, J.,
dissenting)).
142. See Martin J. Lutz, Enforcement of Intellectual Property Laws, 54 CHIMIA INT’L J.
CHEM. 320, 323 (2000) (noting that under the prior Swiss system, “even a largely erroneous
and unfounded court expert opinion [was] likely to be accepted as the basis of the decision”);
infra Part III.A.2.
143. Lutz, supra note 142, at 323.
144. See Techsearch L.L.C., 286 F.3d at 1378; Shira Scheindlin, The Use of Special Masters
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from people who have not been fully vetted or, worse, engage in
judicial abdication. The fact that technical advisors are not members of the court’s staff and generally “work outside the scrutiny of
the parties” also raises transparency concerns.145
Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit’s reasoning is fundamentally
flawed. Beyond relying heavily on a dissenting Ninth Circuit
opinion, it also took the statements of the majority out of context.146
The Ninth Circuit majority spoke of the rarity of a judge needing a
technical advisor,147 but that rarity is likely driven by the fact that
the Ninth Circuit does not hear patent cases.148 Regional case law
on the use of neutral experts has not been developed with patent
litigation in mind, and the Federal Circuit failed to account for
this.149 Indeed, this mismatch between regional law and the specifics of patent litigation raises the question of whether the Federal
Circuit erred in applying Ninth Circuit law with regard to the use
of experts.150
The Federal Circuit furthermore neglected to explain why its
judges, the majority of whom have no technical background,151
should be advised on technology by clerks who are both technically and legally trained. Under the TechSearch court’s reasoning,
most Federal Circuit judges are “ill-equipped” to handle such
input.152 There is no “fair and open procedure” for hiring clerks,
their technical duties are not disclosed to the parties, there is no
in Complex Cases, LAW360 (Aug. 15, 2017, 11:36 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/
950395/the-use-of-special-masters-in-complex-cases [https://perma.cc/MG6G-AJ8K].
145. Rai, supra note 23, at 892; see also PETER MENELL, LYNN H. PASAHOW, JAMES POOLEY,
MATTHEW D. POWERS, STEVEN C. CARLSON & JEFFREY G. HOMRIG, PATENT CASE MANAGEMENT
JUDICIAL GUIDE 5-19 (2d ed. 2012) (discussing transparency concerns regarding judges’ use
of technical advisors).
146. See Luke L. Dauchot & Jeffrey C. Metzcar, Technical Advisors: Welcome Scientific
Education, but at What Cost to a Patent’s Notice Function?, 9 IP LITIGATOR, Mar./Apr. 2003,
at 7 (maintaining that it is “charitable” to characterize the TechSearch court’s holding “as
having weak precedential underpinnings”).
147. Ass’n of Mexican-Am. Educators v. California, 231 F.3d 572, 590 (9th Cir. 2000).
148. Only the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction to hear patent appeals. History of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, FED. CIR. HIST. SOC’Y, https://www.federal
circuiths.org/copy-of-history-of-the-court [https://perma.cc/8MFV-RVY8].
149. See Dauchot & Metzcar, supra note 146, at 6.
150. See id.
151. Rai, supra note 23, at 888.
152. See TechSearch L.L.C. v. Intel Corp., 286 F.3d 1360, 1379 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting
Ass’n of Mexican-Am. Educators, 231 F.3d at 614 (Tashima, J., dissenting)).
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safeguard against extra-record technical information from them, nor
do the parties know what technical tutoring judges receive from
their clerks.153 Perhaps the Federal Circuit judges believe that,
because of their legal specialization, they can distinguish their use
of clerks from district judges’ use of technical advisors. But if that
is the case, at minimum, it favors district courts with high patent
dockets having ready access to technical expertise.
Beyond Federal Circuit case law, other obstacles hinder district
judges’ use of technical advisors. For courts that do not encounter
many patent cases, it may be a time-consuming process to locate a
trusted expert, particularly if the area of technology is complex.154
Experts are expensive, and the cost is passed on directly to the
litigating parties, who typically split the expert’s fees.155 Furthermore, the expert must not only have good credentials but also
possess the ability to teach a lay person the relevant scientific or
technical concepts.156
A few judges in district courts with high patent dockets disregard
TechSearch and regularly use advisors. For example, Judge Gilstrap
in the Eastern District of Texas has several trusted advisors with
patent litigation backgrounds whom he uses in cases with Markman
hearings.157 The party experts still prepare technology tutorials for
Judge Gilstrap, but the advisors will review them and help explain
the technology to him.158 The advisors also help him prepare for the
153. See supra Part II.B.
154. See Edward K. Cheng, Same Old, Same Old: Scientific Evidence Past and Present, 104
MICH. L. REV. 1387, 1395-96 (2006) (surveying TAL GOLAN, LAWS OF MEN AND LAWS OF
NATURE: THE HISTORY OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERT TESTIMONY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA (2004))
(discussing attempts from the 1950s to 1970s to establish lists of neutral experts to make it
easier for judges to use neutral experts); Seuba, supra note 96, at 269 (noting it may be
difficult to find suitable experts for cases involving complex technology).
155. FED. R. EVID. 706(c)(2).
156. For example, Judge Barbara Lynn recounted a case in which she hired a technical
advisor, stating that she chose an expert who teaches undergraduate students and had won
teaching awards “because [she] wanted the person that could talk to [her].” Tips from the
Bench: Assisting Juries in Patent Law Cases, TEX. LAW. ONLINE (June 17, 2013), https://www.
law.com/texaslawyer/almID/1202604221148&Tips_from_the_Bench_Assisting_Juries_in_Pat
ent_Law_Cases/ [https://perma.cc/P9YG-JTSH].
157. See id.; Cara Salvatore, Patent Trial Judges Oppose Posner’s Push for Neutral Experts,
LAW360 (Sept. 30, 2016, 10:12 PM), https://www.law360.com/ip/articles/847078/patent-trialjudges-oppose-posner-s-push-for-neutral-experts [https://perma.cc/ZPM9-DL6P] (describing
Judge Gilstrap’s use of technical advisors).
158. See Judges Discuss Best Practices in Patent Law, supra note 93 (remarks of Hon.
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Markman hearings.159 Other judges, however, continue to utilize
advisors in only extreme cases, as TechSearch advises.160
2. Neutral Testifying Experts Under Federal Rule of
Evidence 706
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 706, a court may appoint experts
to testify to the jury, either “[o]n a party’s motion or on its own.”161
The court may ask the parties for nominations and choose an expert
that the parties agree on, or it may appoint an expert of its own
choosing.162 The court may also choose to disclose to the jury the fact
that the court appointed the expert witness.163 Rule 706 witnesses
may be deposed by the parties, called to testify by the court or a
party, and cross-examined by the parties,164 thereby increasing
transparency in the process.165
The Federal Circuit has held that the use of testifying experts is
sometimes permissible. In Monolithic Power Systems, Inc. v. O2
Micro International Ltd., the Federal Circuit considered whether
such experts violate the Seventh Amendment right to a trial by
jury.166 The Northern District of California judge found the electrical
engineering technology at issue to be “extremely difficult to understand” and maintained that the jury would be confused.167 The judge
appointed a testifying expert, notwithstanding plaintiff O2’s
objections.168 The judge instructed the jury that the expert was “an
independent witness retained by the parties jointly at the court’s
direction to assist in explaining the technology at issue in this
Rodney Gilstrap) (discussing his use of technical advisors).
159. Id.
160. Tips from the Bench, supra note 156.
161. FED. R. EVID. 706(a).
162. Id.
163. Id. 706(d).
164. Id. 706(b).
165. Rai, supra note 23, at 893.
166. 558 F.3d 1341, 1347 (2009).
167. Id. at 1345 (quoting Transcript of Hearing at 35:3-8, Monolithic Power Sys., Inc. v. 02
Micro Int’l Ltd., Nos. C 04-2000 CW, C 06-2929 CW, 2007 WL 3231709 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30,
2007)) (“And the notion that a jury is going to understand it, to me, is foolishness. You can
talk for months and the jury isn’t really going to understand this in the sense of being able
to make a reasoned, rational decision about it.”).
168. Id. at 1345-46.

900

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:871

case.”169 The expert’s testimony supported defendant Monolithic
Power Systems, and the jury returned a verdict in its favor.170 O2
appealed, arguing that the court’s use of a testifying expert violated
the Seventh Amendment.171
Applying Ninth Circuit case law and TechSearch, the Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court.172 Although it maintained that
Rule 706 experts “should be invoked only in rare and compelling
circumstances,” the Federal Circuit noted that Ninth Circuit law
provides judges with “wide latitude to make these appointments.”173
The court consequently held that the district court did not abuse its
discretion, given that the case was “unusually complex” and that
there “appeared to be starkly conflicting expert testimony.”174
The use of such experts remains rare. Notwithstanding Monolithic Power Systems, several judges have expressed concern that
testifying experts can unduly influence the jury and undermine a
party’s right to a trial by jury.175 Moreover, as with nontestifying
experts, there is also an issue with regard to the parties having to
share the cost of the expert.176
3. Special Masters
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53, a district judge may
appoint a special master to “perform duties consented to by the
parties,” “hold trial proceedings and make or recommend findings
of fact on issues to be decided without a jury” in certain circumstances, or to “address pretrial and posttrial matters that cannot be
effectively and timely addressed” by the judge.177 Rule 53(c) gives
the special master authority to conduct evidentiary hearings and
169. Id. at 1346 (quoting Transcript of Trial at 96:21-24, Monolithic Power Sys., Inc., 2007
WL 3231709).
170. Id. at 1345-46.
171. Id. at 1347.
172. Id. at 1346, 1348.
173. Id. at 1348.
174. Id.
175. See Salvatore, supra note 157 (statements of Hon. William Young and Hon. William
Conley) (expressing concern that having a neutral expert testify to a jury can unduly influence
the jury’s decision).
176. FED. R. EVID. 706(c)(2).
177. FED. R. CIV. P. 53(a)(1).
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take and record evidence.178 When the special master issues a
recommendation or order, the parties have an opportunity to appeal
it to the court.179 All questions of law are reviewed de novo, as are
questions of fact unless the parties stipulate otherwise.180 Under no
circumstance may the special master usurp the role of the judge.181
In unusually complex patent cases,182 special masters are used in
various areas, including claim construction, validity, infringement,
and discovery.183 They tend to be attorneys specializing in patent
law with technical degrees and years of experience.184 In patent
cases, they typically write reports or make recommendations with
regard to claim construction, discovery, or both, though sometimes
they also opine on summary judgment motions.185 In addition to
appointing special masters under Rule 53, judges can also use their
inherent authority or Federal Rule of Evidence 706 to hire them.186
Special masters, however, are seldom used in patent cases.187
Judges may be reluctant to use special masters without both
parties’ consent because the parties typically share the cost.188 Due
178. Id. 53(c).
179. Id. 53(f)(1).
180. Id. 53(f)(3). The parties may agree for findings of fact to be reviewed for clear error or
may decide the special master’s findings of fact are final. Id.
181. See Kimberly v. Arms, 129 U.S. 512, 524 (1889) (observing that a court may not use
a special master to “abdicate its duty to determine by its own judgment the controversy
presented”).
182. See JAY P. KESAN & GWENDOLYN G. BALL, FED. JUD. CTR., A STUDY OF THE ROLE AND
IMPACT OF SPECIAL MASTERS IN PATENT CASES 9 (2009), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/
files/2012/SpecMaPa.pdf [https://perma.cc/E7RF-P349] (observing that “in most cases, the
special master was appointed after the parties realized that the case was highly complex and
the issues difficult to resolve between the parties” and noting that, on average, cases had
“been ongoing for 1,100 days when the special master [was] appointed”).
183. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki, Co., 72 F.3d 857, 866 (Fed. Cir.
1995), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 520 U.S. 1111 (1997) (holding that the use of
a special master did not deprive the parties of a right to a trial by jury); In re Newman, 763
F.2d 407, 409 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (noting that “[t]he district court appointed a special master”
because of “the substantial and contradictory submissions of record and the complicated
issues of scientific and technical fact”).
184. KESAN & BALL, supra note 182, at 4-5.
185. Id. at 6.
186. Scheindlin, supra note 144.
187. Of the 5,500 patent cases that terminated in 2005 and 2006, only 116 utilized a special
master—a rate of 2.1 percent. KESAN & BALL, supra note 182, at 1.
188. See Scheindlin, supra note 144 (“Parties typically share the costs of special masters,
but some courts have assigned all costs to the party whose behavior in some way caused the
need for the appointment. Or compensation can be paid from a common fund.”); David R.
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to their infrequent use, coupled with the fact that cases utilizing
them are unusually complex, it is difficult to assess how helpful
special masters are.189 Although there has been proposed legislation
that would fund studying whether their use has been beneficial and
should be expanded, such proposals have not gained traction.190
To conclude, although independent technical expertise is theoretically available to district judges, many challenges prevent their use.
As Part III notes, however, several European courts have developed
a better way of providing expertise through the use of technically
trained judges.
III. EUROPE’S TECHNICALLY QUALIFIED JUDGES
As in the United States, several courts in Europe feature judges
with legal expertise in patents.191 But what differentiates courts in
several EU member states is their use of TQJs, who generally lack
law degrees and are hired for their scientific or technical
knowledge.192 TQJs work alongside their legal counterparts and are
assigned only to cases that involve technology that they have
expertise in.193 Section A examines the use of TQJs in Germany,
Switzerland, and the proposed Unified Patent Court. Section B then
considers the advantages and disadvantages of utilizing TQJs.

Cohen, Special Masters Versus Magistrate Judges: No Contest, 61 FED. LAW. 73, 75 (2014)
(observing that parties typically split the cost of a special master).
189. KESAN & BALL, supra note 182, at 10-11.
190. See Neil A. Smith, Complex Patent Suits: The Use of Special Masters for Claim
Construction, 2 LANDSLIDE 36, 37 (2009) (discussing section 16 of H.R. 1260, 111th Cong.
(2009), which proposed a study of special masters in patent litigation).
191. See ALEXANDER HARGUTH WITH STEVEN CARLSON, PATENTS IN GERMANY AND EUROPE
2 (2011).
192. See Christian Osterrieth, Patent Enforcement in Germany, in PATENT ENFORCEMENT
WORLDWIDE 111, 122 (Christopher Heath ed., 3d ed. 2015) (discussing Germany’s use of TQJs
in Federal Patent Court).
193. See id.
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A. European Courts Utilizing Technically Qualified Judges
1. The German Federal Patent Court
Germany is a major hub for patent litigation, with close to eight
hundred cases filed in 2018 alone.194 It is a preferred EU country to
litigate in, because proceedings are regarded as fast and cheap, and
injunctions are always awarded upon a finding of infringement.195
Patent litigation in Germany is bifurcated between infringement
and validity claims.196 Infringement cases are heard in one of twelve
regional courts,197 with each trial court having at least one specialized patent chamber, allowing patent cases to be heard by judges
who develop legal expertise in the field.198 Several German regional
courts are regarded as experts in patent infringement cases; the
Düsseldorf court is the most popular with patent litigants, followed
by the Mannheim and Munich courts.199 The German Federal
Patent Court (German FPC) has exclusive jurisdiction over validity

194. See Schönbohm et al., supra note 27, at 108.
195. See id.; HARGUTH WITH CARLSON, supra note 191, at 2-3 (discussing the speed and low
cost of German patent litigation). Note, however, that pretrial discovery is limited and
damages are far more modest compared to those in the United States. Id.
196. Schönbohm et al., supra note 27, at 110.
197. Christian Helmers, The Economic Analysis of Patent Litigation Data 6 (World Intell.
Prop. Org., Working Paper No. 48, 2018), https://www.wipo.int/publications/en/details.jsp?
id=4370&plang=EN [https://perma.cc/NGY8-3AG4]; Katrin Cremers, Max Ernicke, Fabian
Gaessler, Dietmar Harhoff, Christian Helmers, Luke McDonagh, Paula Schliessler & Nicolas
van Zeebroeck, Patent Litigation in Europe, 44 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 1, 5 (2016) (discussing the
jurisdiction of regional circuit courts over patent infringement cases).
198. See Osterrieth, supra note 192, at 122 (discussing how patent chamber judges gain
technical experience and knowledge by working on many patent cases); Matthias Ricker &
Philipp Neels, Find and Share the Knowledge: Germany, PAT. LAW., May/June 2015, at 41.
Note that the Mannheim and Munich courts have two patent chambers, and the Düsseldorf
court has three. Alexander Harguth, Patent Disputes: Guide for Patent Litigation in Germany,
PREU BOHLIG & PARTNER 6 (2016), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/3bbf/72a98fef53c029ed
8ecc2ac1f1aa38c40282.pdf [https://perma.cc/M9FW-YQAQ].
199. Mathieu Klos, Decline in Cases at German Patent Courts, JUVE PAT. (July 12, 2019),
https://www.juve-patent.com/market-analysis-and-rankings/courts-and-patent-offices/declinein-cases-at-german-patent-courts/ [https://perma.cc/CUM8-57RV]. Cases from these courts
appeal first to a court of appeals and then to the Federal Supreme Court. Katrin Cremers,
Fabian Gaessler, Dietmar Harhoff, Christian Helmers & Yassine Lefouili, Invalid but
Infringed? An Analysis of the Bifurcated Patent Litigation System, 131 J. ECON. BEHAV. &
ORG. 218, 221 (2016).
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disputes (which are called “nullity proceedings”) and appeals from
the German Patent and Trademark Office.200
The real innovation of the German system comes from the
German FPC’s use of nonlawyer TQJs. Under section 65 of the
German Patent Act, judges on the German FPC may be either
legally trained “or have expertise in a field of technology.”201
Consequently, more than half of the court’s 102 judges are technically qualified.202 TQJs must possess a technical master’s degree or
equivalent, and have at least five years of work experience in their
relevant fields.203 All of the TQJs are former patent examiners who
each have at least five to seven years of experience there.204 They
are therefore highly knowledgeable about patent law, notwithstanding their lack of a law degree.205 TQJs are treated as equals to LQJs:
they receive lifetime appointments on the bench, share the same
benefits, and generally have the same duties.206
German FPC judges are subdivided into seven different types of
“boards”—three of which relate to patents.207 The six nullity boards
consider challenges to patent validity; three of the five judges on
each of the nullity boards are technically qualified.208 The ten
technical boards of appeal hear appeals of patent application
rejections;209 their panels contain one LQJ and three TQJs.210 The
200. See FABIAN GÄßLER, ENFORCING AND TRADING PATENTS 65 (2016) (discussing the
bifurcation of validity and litigation proceedings in the German national court system).
201. Patentgesetz [PatG] [Patent Act], Dec. 16, 1980, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL
I] at 24, § 65, last amended by Gesetz [G], Oct. 8, 2017, BGBL I at 3546 (Ger.),
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_patg/ [https://perma.cc/A6LS-Y5KX].
202. The Court: Organisation, BUNDESPATENTGERICHT, https://www.bundespatentger
icht.de/EN/TheCourt/Organisation/organisation_node.html [https://perma.cc/5TRL-3V5V].
203. Patentgesetz [PatG] [Patent Act], Dec. 16, 1980, BGBL I at 10, § 26.
204. Schmidt, supra note 18, at 110.
205. See id.
206. Id.
207. The Court: Organisation, supra note 202 (“The Federal Patent Court adjudicates in
a total of 25 boards ... : 6 nullity boards, 1 juridical board of appeal and nullity board, 10
technical boards of appeal, 5 boards of appeal for trade marks, 1 board of appeal for trade
marks and designs, 1 board of appeal for utility models, and 1 board of appeal in plant variety
cases.”).
208. See Schmidt, supra note 18, at 111.
209. The Court: Organisation, supra note 202 (noting there are ten technical boards of
appeal).
210. See The Federal Patent Court, BUNDESPATENTGERICHT 10 (2012) [hereinafter German
FPC Brochure], https://www.bundespatentgericht.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/Infobrochur
es/InfobrochureE_download.pdf [https://perma.cc/75UJ-N7R9]. In the event of a tie, the legally
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single judicial board of appeal contains three LQJs.211 It hears,
among other things, requests from the German Patent and Trademark Office to determine administrative and coercive measures
against witnesses or experts, challenges against judges, and appeals
regarding the determination of costs.212
Because expertise is integrated into the German judicial system,
the German FPC is not dependent upon outside experts for validity
proceedings.213 If a validity case involves “technically complex” facts
that the TQJs lack expertise in, the Board is expected to request an
expert opinion.214 However, this is uncommon, given that TQJs are
experts in their respective technical fields.215
It is important to note that the German system has limitations.
Part of its popularity is driven by its use of bifurcated litigation,
which makes it difficult and costly for defendants in infringement
proceedings to challenge the validity of the patent claims at issue,
leading to fewer such challenges.216 Regional courts are generally
reluctant to stay an infringement proceeding pending a validity
challenge in the German FPC, which, in the past, led to patentees
receiving injunctions for patents that were found to be invalid years
later.217 Also, the fact that a law degree is an undergraduate degree
trained presiding judge decides the case. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. See Schmidt, supra note 18, at 110 (noting that the TQJs’ expertise generally covers
all fields, such that the court rarely needs outside experts).
214. GÄßLER, supra note 200, at 20.
215. German FPC Brochure, supra note 210, at 1 (observing that because TQJs “are experts
in one particular technical field, the Federal Patent Court generally has no need to call in
external experts”).
216. See Cremers et al., supra note 199, at 235-36 (noting that the bifurcated system
contributes to Germany’s reputation as a patent-friendly jurisdiction); Helmers, supra note
197, at 5 (noting that evidence suggests “a bifurcated system, in which infringement is usually
decided first, leads to fewer validity challenges than in a unified system” and that
“infringement actions are more likely to settle”); Cremers et al., supra note 197, at 12
(observing that bifurcation “creates the problem that an infringement court might issue an
injunction against a defendant on the basis of a broad claim construction which would
inevitably lead to the invalidation in view of a certain piece of prior art”); Osterrieth, supra
note 192, at 111-12 (noting that a patent can be enforced even when there is an open question
regarding validity). Although the civil court can stay the proceeding pending a validity
determination, this happens only if the court believes there is a high likelihood of invalidity.
Id. at 112.
217. Schönbohm et al., supra note 27, at 110-12, 124. Note that the German government
is currently working on reforming the system so that a qualified opinion on patent validity
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in Germany means that the country had to adopt a system that was
not dependent upon lawyers who possess technical degrees.218
Unlike in the United States, a German patent attorney (Patentanwalt) is not a lawyer, but rather, a scientist or engineer who
possesses some legal training and has limited powers.219
These issues, however, do not detract from the fact that the use
of TQJs appears to improve the German FPC’s ability to decide
patent cases. Because specialized judges hear validity cases, they
acquire experience in construing claims, which increases certainty
in patent litigation.220 The German FPC was successful enough that
it served as a model for the Swiss Federal Patent Court (Swiss FPC)
and the proposed UPC, which are discussed in turn below.
2. The Swiss Federal Patent Court
Prior to 2012, Switzerland’s twenty-six cantons each had a trial
court that heard cases in a variety of subject areas, including
patents.221 Because four urban cantons heard the majority of patent
disputes, most of the Swiss canton courts had little patent experience,222 with many judges hearing only one or two patent cases in
their entire career.223 Even the courts that had a relatively high
volume of patent cases were not regarded as being particularly
skillful, given that there are only fifteen to twenty Swiss patent

is available within six months of filing a nullity proceeding. See Mathieu Klos, German
Government Wants to Change Patent Law, JUVE PAT. (Jan. 15, 2020), https://www.juvepatent.com/news-and-stories/legal-commentary/german-government-wants-to-change-patentlaw/ [https://perma.cc/S8Z9-9P52].
218. See generally Jochen Lehmann, Regulation of the Legal Profession in Germany:
Overview, THOMSON REUTERS PRAC. L., https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/2-6388145 [https://perma.cc/Q6N7-PWAB]; Selina Grün, The German vs. the American Law School
Experience, LIFE AT NYU L. (Dec. 15, 2015), https://blogs.law.nyu.edu/lifeatnyulaw/thegerman-vs-the-american-law-school-experience/ [https://perma.cc/VKN3-2EFC].
219. See Lehmann, supra note 218.
220. See Cremers et al., supra note 197, at 12 (noting that TQJs “facilitat[e] coherent and
well-founded claim construction and therefore increase legal certainty regarding the validity
of patents”).
221. Hess, supra note 19, at 275.
222. The commercial courts of Zurich, Argovia, Saint-Gall, and Berne heard the majority
of patent cases prior to 2012. Id.
223. Lutz, supra note 142, at 323.
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cases a year.224 The lack of consistency among the different cantons
predictably led to forum shopping.225
Swiss law forbids courts from relying on party experts for technical information,226 which meant that the generalist canton courts
relied upon neutral experts.227 This led to some judges delegating
decision-making to a court-appointed neutral expert, whose findings
were granted undue deference.228 As attorney Martin Lutz noted:
“The almost blind reliance on the findings of the court expert ... is
almost inevitable if the court lacks the technical knowledge to
evaluate the conclusions of the expert and the criticism that the
parties may present.”229 Lutz further noted “that even a largely
erroneous and unfounded court expert opinion [was] likely to be
accepted as the basis of the decision” by the canton judges.230
To address these problems, Switzerland amended its constitution
and subsequently passed the Federal Patent Court Act, establishing
the Swiss FPC.231 Unlike Germany’s bifurcated system, the Swiss
FPC has nationwide jurisdiction over both validity and infringement
disputes, and has concurrent jurisdiction with canton courts for disputes arising out of patent licensing agreements.232 The court’s
224. Id.
225. Felix Addor & Claudia Mund, The Swiss Federal Patent Court: A Model to Follow?, in
WHAT PATENT LAW FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION?, supra note 18, at 159, 161 (discussing how the
“fragmentation of the patent litigation system” led to “forum shopping, patent torpedoes and
costly expert disputes in Switzerland”).
226. Cyrill P. Rigamonti, Swiss Patent Jurisprudence 2012, 4 J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH.
& ELEC. COM. L. 53, 60 n.4 (2012).
227. Id. at 53.
228. Lutz, supra note 142, at 323. This problem occurs outside patent law as well. See EUR.
COMM’N FOR THE EFFICIENCY OF JUST., STUDY ON THE ROLE OF EXPERTS IN JUDICIAL SYSTEMS
OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE MEMBER STATES 4 (2014) (discussing several examples of
European courts overly relying on neutral experts).
229. Lutz, supra note 142, at 323.
230. Id. The problem of canton judges overly relying on neutral experts parallels the
concerns expressed by the Federal Circuit in TechSearch. See supra Part II.C.1.
231. Hess, supra note 19, at 275.
232. Id.; BUNDESGESETZ ÜBER DAS BUNDESPATENTGERICHT [PATENTGERICHTSGESETZ,
PATGG] [Federal Act on the Federal Patent Court] Mar. 20, 2009, SR 173.41, art. 26 (Switz.)
[hereinafter Swiss Patent Court Act], https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/
20071763/index.html [https://perma.cc/NB9E-BV7M]. The court also has jurisdiction over
patent disputes arising from Liechtenstein. Treaty Between the Swiss Confederation and the
Principality of Liechtenstein on Patent Protection, Liech.-Switz., art. 1, Dec. 22, 1978, OJ
EPO 1980, 407, https://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/official-journal/2016/etc/se4/
p511.html [https://perma.cc/E3TE-6X7N].
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design is unusual, in that it relies heavily upon part-time judges:
the court is comprised of twenty-seven technically trained part-time
judges, thirteen legally trained part-time judges, and only two
permanent judges (including the President of the Swiss FPC).233 The
Swiss FPC calls upon and pays these part-time judges on a case-bycase basis.234 The TQJs possess expertise in physics, chemistry,
biology, electrical engineering, computer science, medicine, and
mechanical engineering,235 which reduces the need for outside
neutral experts.236 Trial-level patent proceedings are heard by
panels of three judges: one TQJ, one LQJ, and one legally qualified
permanent judge.237
The Swiss system does have several drawbacks. Because all of the
part-time judges are employed elsewhere—frequently as practicing
lawyers or European patent attorneys—the court must mitigate
conflicts of interest.238 This is particularly problematic when large
multinational companies are litigating. Judges also are elected by
the Swiss parliament for a mere six-year renewable term, as opposed to lifetime appointments.239 Furthermore, the President of the
FPC selects the panels,240 which could theoretically allow the
President to influence the outcome of the decision through panel
selection—a problem that has been seen in the United States in
PTAB proceedings.241
233. About the Court: Judges, BUNDESPATENTGERICHT, https://www.bundespatentger
icht.ch/en/about-the-court/judges/ [https://perma.cc/CSG9-7ARW] (providing a roster of Swiss
FPC judges). Two of the legally trained judges are also technically trained. Id.
234. Rigamonti, supra note 226, at 53; Hess, supra note 19, at 276.
235. About the Court: Judges, supra note 233. Twelve of the twenty-seven judges have
chemistry degrees, nine have physics degrees, and the remainder are trained in biology,
medicine, mechanical engineering, and electrotechnology (electrical engineering). Id.
236. Rigamonti, supra note 226, at 57, 60; see also Swiss Patent Court Act, supra note 232,
art. 37(3) (“Where a technically trained judge possesses specific expertise, the judge’s expert
opinion shall be entered in the court record. The parties shall be given an opportunity to
submit their position on the court record.”).
237. Fritz Blumer, Patent Enforcement in Switzerland, in PATENT ENFORCEMENT
WORLDWIDE, supra note 192, ¶ 9, at 258. Note that some judges are dual-qualified.
238. Id. ¶ 8, at 257.
239. Addor & Mund, supra note 225, at 164.
240. REGELUNGEN ZUM BUNDESPATENTGERICHT [PR-PatC] [Regulations on the Federal
Patent Court] Sept. 28, 2011, art. 3(e) (Switz.), https://www.bundespatentgericht.ch/fileadmin/
web-dateien/014.221_Geschaeftsreglement_fuer_das_Bundespatentgericht_EN_per_
121212.pdf [https://perma.cc/58WJ-WAXR].
241. If the Director of the Patent and Trademark Office is unhappy with the outcome of a
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3. The Unified Patent Court
Although an EU-wide patent is available from the European
Patent Office, patent holders that wish to enforce their rights must
do so on a country-by-country basis.242 This leads to wasteful
duplicative proceedings and divergent judgments, and may ultimately hinder innovation.243 To solve these problems, a uniform
patent court system has been proposed. The Agreement on a Unified
Patent Court (UPCA) is an international treaty that, if ratified,244
would create the Unified Patent Court (UPC)—a court with

case, he or she can order a rehearing and designate two like-minded members of the PTAB
to serve on the expanded panel. This practice is known as “panel stacking.” See Christopher
J. Walker & Melissa F. Wasserman, The New World of Agency Adjudication, 107 CALIF. L.
REV. 141, 178-79 (2019) (discussing the Director’s use of panel stacking).
242. See DIETMAR HARHOFF, ECONOMIC COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF A UNIFIED AND
INTEGRATED EUROPEAN PATENT LITIGATION SYSTEM 7 (2009), https://www.researchgate.net/
publication/267839173_Economic_Cost-Benefit_Analysis_of_a_Unified_and_Integrated_
European_Patent_Litigation_System [https://perma.cc/YMX8-6YTV] (discussing the lack of
“a unified and integrated patent litigation system”); Clement Salung Petersen & Jens
Schovsbo, Decision-Making in the Unified Patent Court: Ensuring a Balanced Approach, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE JUDICIARY, supra note 96, at 231, 231 (noting that the UPC
will have “exclusive competence to hear most actions concerning European patents (with or
without unitary effect)” and “will become the new judiciary for litigation relating to
infringement and validity of such patents in most of Europe”).
243. See HARHOFF, supra note 242, at 15.
244. Under the original terms of the UCPA, the UPC will not be established unless the
three largest patent-granting states at the time—Germany, the United Kingdom, and
France—ratify the UPCA. United Kingdom Ratifies Unified Patent Court Agreement, EPO
(Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.epo.org/news-issues/news/2018/20180426.html [https://perma.cc/
8GDS-BFCU]. Although the United Kingdom and France ratified the UPCA, Germany did
not, due to a court decision invalidating its first attempt to ratify the agreement. See Mathieu
Klos, Germany Hastens Second Ratification of Unified Patent Court, JUVE (Oct. 2, 2020),
https://www.juve-patent.com/news-and-stories/legal-commentary/germany-hastens-secondratification-of-unified-patent-court/ [https://perma.cc/FBG3-JP5F]. As of late 2020, the UPCA
has passed both houses of the German parliament, but it is still possible that a second legal
action will be filed against it. German Bundesrat Approves Ratification of Unified Patent
Court Agreement, WOLTERS KLUWER: KLUWER PAT. BLOG (Dec. 18, 2020), http://patentblog.
kluweriplaw.com/2020/12/18/german-bundesrat-approves-ratification-of-unified-patent-courtagreement/ [https://perma.cc/YZC4-DTG3]. Questions also exist regarding how the United
Kingdom’s withdrawal from the UPCA and EU will impact the UPC’s future. See Heidi
Hurdle, Unitary Patent—Back in Business?, FIELDFISHER (Dec. 3, 2020), https://www.field
fisher.com/en/services/intellectual-property/intellectual-property-blog/unitary-patent-back-inbusiness [https://perma.cc/73A2-YA6H].
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exclusive jurisdiction over the litigation of disputes pertaining to
European and Unitary patents.245
The UPC will make extensive use of TQJs, who must meet several
requirements. Like all UPC judges, the TQJs are required to “have
proven experience in the field of patent litigation,”246 have nationality in an EU member state, and “a good command of at least one
official language of the European Patent Office.”247 They must also
be geographically diverse to the extent possible248 and have
nationality in an EU member state.249 Furthermore, TQJs must
possess a technical undergraduate degree, experience in a technological field, and knowledge of patent-related civil law and procedure.250
UPC trial courts will be divided into central division, local, and
regional courts.251 Three central division courts will each hear cases
in a different area of technology,252 with panels comprising one TQJ
and two LQJs.253 Individual countries may also choose to set up local
divisions or join with other countries to create regional divisions.254
Local and regional divisions will use three LQJs on panels by
default,255 though a TQJ will be used if a party or the panel requests
245. Agreement on a Unified Patent Court (UPCA), arts. 1, 32(1) (proposed treaty),
https://www.unified-patent-court.org/sites/default/files/upc-agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/
J4DN-CDYD] (establishing the UPC “for the settlement of disputes relating to European
patents and European patents with unitary effect” and discussing the UPC’s exclusive
jurisdiction).
246. Id. art. 15(1).
247. Id. annex I, art. 2(2) (Statute of the Unified Patent Court (SUPC)).
248. Id. annex I, art. 3(3) (SUPC).
249. Id. annex I, art. 2(1) (SUPC).
250. Id. art. 15(3). To gain knowledge of the UPC Rules of Procedure and the substantive
law under the UPCA, there are training programs available, such as that at the University
of Strasbourg’s Center for International Intellectual Property. Update Modules on the Unified
Patent Court, CTR. FOR INT’L INTELL. PROP. STUD. (2020), http://www.ceipi.edu/en/patentlitigation-in-europe-unified-patent-court/update-modules-on-the-unified-patent-court/
[https://perma.cc/8YWR-KLYJ].
251. UPCA, supra note 245, art. 8(1)-(2).
252. Originally, London, Paris, and Munich were to host the central divisions. Id. art. 7(2).
Because of Brexit, it now appears that the Paris and Munich courts will initially split the
workload for the London court until a third central division host can be selected. See Klos,
supra note 244.
253. See UPCA, supra note 245, art. 7(2) (noting the locations of the central divisions); id.
art. 8(6).
254. Id. art. 7(3)-(5).
255. Id. art. 8(2)-(3).
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one.256 The Court of Appeals in Luxembourg will hear all appeals
and will sit in panels comprising three LQJs and two TQJs.257
There are several notable features of the UPC. First, although
LQJs and full-time TQJs will be assigned to a particular court, the
group as a whole will participate in a “Pool of Judges” (along with
part-time TQJs).258 These judges may be staffed onto cases in any
local or regional division panel as needed, and TQJs can also be
staffed onto Court of Appeals panels.259 To ensure breadth of
experience, local divisions that average less than fifty patent cases
a year may use only one local LQJ, and those that hear an average
of fifty or more cases a year will be permitted two LQJs.260 This
should ensure that skilled judges are involved in every trial court
case and provide an opportunity for less-skilled judges to gain
experience. Additional judges for panels in such cases will come
from the Pool.261
Second, UPC judges will possess far more power than their U.S.
counterparts. The UPCA creates an Administrative Committee,
which can amend the agreement to improve the functioning of the
court or to comply with international agreements relating to patents
under EU law.262 However, amendments on any other ground
appear to require consensus from all of the UPC members.263 This
means that unlike the U.S. court system, in which Congress can
override patent decisions somewhat easily, UPC decisions may be
difficult to dismantle.264
256. Id. art. 8(5).
257. Id. art. 9(1).
258. Id. art. 18(2).
259. Id.
260. Id. art. 8(2)-(3).
261. Id.
262. Id. art. 87(1)-(2).
263. See id. art. 87(1)-(3); Thorsten Bausch, More Exciting Than You May Think: How
Germany Intends to Implement the UPC Agreement (UCPA), WOLTERS KLUWER: KLUWER PAT.
BLOG (Mar. 6, 2016), http://patentblog.kluweriplaw.com/2016/03/06/more-exciting-than-youmay-think-how-germany-intends-to-implement-the-upc-agreement-upca/ [https://perma.cc/
3PYS-UUKD] (discussing how a participating country may object to a UPCA amendment,
implying “that changes to the law must also be reviewed and approved by the lawmaker”).
264. Compare KEVIN T. RICHARDS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10344, JUDGES URGE CONGRESS
TO REVISE WHAT CAN BE PATENTED 4 (2020), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/
pdf/LSB/LSB10344 [https://perma.cc/UR44-LAH4] (indicating that Congress is “the central
avenue for revisions” for certain patent decisions), with UPCA, supra note 245, art. 87
(outlining the process for objecting to amendments in the UPC).
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Although the UPC is not yet in force, it has the potential to
remedy many of the problems that the U.S. judicial system currently experiences. Independent technical expertise will be integrated at the trial and appellate level, which should aid the judges
in making accurate decisions. Although there are some disadvantages to using TQJs, discussed below, the UPC should be an
improvement over the status quo in the EU.
B. Benefits and Drawbacks of Technically Trained Judges in
Patent Litigation
There are several advantages to courts utilizing mixed panels of
TQJs and LQJs. As the German FPC President Beate Schmidt has
noted, “[l]egally trained judges can ask questions concerning the
technical content of a patent any time,” because expert TQJs “who
know the facts of the case and the patent law are always at hand.”265
This ensures that the panel understands relevant technical facts in
an efficient manner and promotes accuracy and predictability.266
LQJs can, in turn, explain complicated legal issues to the TQJs.267
Unlike party experts, TQJs are independent and impartial,268
meaning that LQJs do not have to waste time sifting through
competing accounts of relevant technology. This combination of
technical and patent expertise on panels may promote better
decision-making.269
TQJs also reduce the court’s dependency on outside technical
experts—who are expensive, time-consuming to find, and potentially
biased.270 As Schmidt observed, because outside experts are not
265. Schmidt, supra note 18, at 111.
266. STEFAN LUGINBUEHL, EUROPEAN PATENT LAW: TOWARDS A UNIFORM INTERPRETATION
230-31 (Edward Elgar ed., 2011) (discussing how TQJs are an efficient way to ensure the
panel understands relevant technical facts); Beate Schmidt, President, Fed. Pat. Ct., Technically Trained Judges in Germany, Presentation at The University of Strasbourg 23-24 (Apr.
27, 2019) [hereinafter Schmidt Presentation] (slides with author).
267. LUGINBUEHL, supra note 266, at 231-32.
268. Schmidt Presentation, supra note 266, at 13, 26.
269. See Seuba, supra note 96, at 278 (“Technical judges foster coherence in the
jurisprudence, reduce factual errors, contribute to clearly identifying the issues of relevance
in the case, and lead to more reasoned and practical decisions.”); Schmidt, supra note 18, at
111 (maintaining that the use of TQJs “is a perfect way to improve the quality of decisions”).
270. See Gäßler, supra note 200, at 88 (discussing how utilizing technically trained FPC
judges lowers the cost of litigation by reducing the need for outside experts); Hans-Georg
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involved in the actual decision-making, they do not have to take
responsibility for their opinions.271 Germany’s system of hiring
former patent examiners as TQJs could also help with the retention
of talented technically trained patent examiners by providing them
with a career path.272
Perhaps the greatest advantage of courts utilizing TQJs is that it
makes technical expertise the norm, guaranteeing that in every case
there will be “a thorough examination of the technical merits” for
the relevant claims.273 Suppose that a judge presiding over a patent
case encounters unfamiliar technology and needs assistance understanding it. Under the current U.S. system, the judge must establish that the case at issue is technically complex, locate a suitable
expert, and justify the cost being passed on to the parties.274 By
contrast, a German FPC judge merely needs to ask one of the TQJs
working on the same case to explain it.275 The judge may feel more
comfortable asking a peer such a question, as opposed to an outside
party.
Admittedly, there are some disadvantages associated with the use
of technical judges. To be effective, a court must hire judges with a
variety of technical backgrounds, so that judges work only on cases
in their areas of expertise.276 This can be expensive, especially if
there are technological areas in which not many cases are heard.277
Landfermann, Nonobviousness in German Patent Nullity Proceedings, in PATENTS AND
TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD 31, 32 (Wolrad Prinz au Waldeck und
Pyrmont et al. eds., 2009) (“The inclusion of Technical Judges in the Nullity Senates of this
court allows a decision without external experts; by this, the proceedings become cheaper and
quicker.”); German FPC Brochure, supra note 210, at 1 (noting that because TQJs are able to
provide needed expertise, it “leads to proceedings being cost-effective and swift” compared to
using neutral outside experts).
271. Schmidt Presentation, supra note 266, at 26.
272. Id. at 12.
273. Schmidt, supra note 18, at 111.
274. See FED. R. EVID. 706(a), (c)(2); Mark J. Feldstein, Shana K. Cyr & Kelly S. Horn,
Experts in Patent Cases: A Three-Part Examination of Federal Rules of Evidence 701706—Part III, FINNEGAN (June 2018), https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/articles/expertsin-patent-cases-a-three-part-examination-of-federal-rules-of-evidence-701706-part-iii.html
[https://perma.cc/J3HL-9STC].
275. Schmidt, supra note 18, at 111.
276. See id. at 112 (noting that technical judges should sit only in cases that they have
technical expertise in).
277. Seuba, supra note 96, at 280; Jacques de Werra, Specialised Intellectual Property
Courts-Issues and Challenges, in GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES AND CHALLENGES FOR THE
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Although the courts can use part-time TQJs, they must be careful
to avoid conflicts of interest if the judges hold other employment.278
Furthermore, neutral experts may still sometimes be needed if a
legal question turns on highly specialized technology.279
In the context of the proposed UPC, some scholars have expressed
concern that the use of technical judges may also contribute towards
a bias in favor of “technology-based values.”280 Clement Petersen
and Jens Schovsbo note that by valuing technical expertise too
strongly, UPC judges may lack broader legal experience beyond
patent law, which could give rise to institutional biases such as
tunnel vision.281 This concern is particularly acute for the UPC,
given judges would be either legally or technically specialized in
patent law at both the trial and appellate level.282 Although the
structure of the UPC gives the Administrative Committee discretion
to hire judges with general judicial skills and nonpatent practical
expertise,283 it is unclear if such knowledge will be valued by those
conducting the hiring. To counterbalance these problems, some
experts recommend that judges be made aware of potential biases
stemming from the court’s design and be provided with broad legal
training beyond just patent law.284
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SYSTEM 15, 26-27 (2016), http://www.ceipi.edu/fileadmin/upload/
DUN/CEIPI/Documents/Publications_CEIPI___ICTSD/CEIPI_ICTSD_N__2.pdf [https://
perma.cc/UEA5-QQEA].
278. Switzerland has strict guidelines for avoiding conflicts of interest with part-time
judges. See Seuba, supra note 96, at 285. Nevertheless, given the small size of the country,
it is likely difficult to avoid conflicts for litigation involving large corporations, given that
many Swiss patent judges work in law firms. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
279. LUGINBUEHL, supra note 266, at 232.
280. See Petersen & Schovsbo, supra note 242, at 232-33 (emphasis omitted).
281. Id. at 242-43.
282. See German FPC Brochure, supra note 210, at 10 (illustrating the specialization of the
UPC’s appellate courts).
283. See UPCA, supra note 245, annex I, art. 3(3) (SUPC) (requiring the Administrative
Committee to appoint judges with “the best legal and technical expertise”); Petersen &
Schovsbo, supra note 242, at 242-43 (noting that the UPC judge qualification requirements
include “generic judicial skills such as ‘work efficiency; cooperation abilities; writing skills;
general judgement ability,’” as well as “judicial ethics, experience in meeting tight deadlines,
oral communication skills, the capacity to work in a multinational and multilingual
environment” and the like (quoting Information on the Selection Process of Judges at the Unified Patent Court, UNIFIED PAT. CT., https://www.unified-patent-court.org/sites/default/files/
en_recruitment_information.pdf [https://perma.cc/DTH9-LNCK])).
284. See Jens Schovsbo, Thomas Riis & Clement Salung Petersen, The Unified Patent
Court: Pros and Cons of Specialization—Is There a Light at the End of the Tunnel (Vision)?,
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These concerns are similar to more general concerns regarding
specialized courts.285 For example, scholars—including this one—
have argued that the Federal Circuit is overly specialized and lacks
the sufficient breadth that comes with a robust nonpatent docket.286
In the U.S. system, such a concentration of expertise in the judicial
branch arguably undermines separation of powers.287
Another problem exists with regard to figuring out whether TQJs
would work in the United States: a lack of data. In Germany, the
votes of individual judges are not made public outside of the Federal
Constitutional Court.288 Switzerland’s 2012 switch to using TQJs289
may provide an opportunity to compare cases before and after the
change. However, the switch was coupled with removing jurisdiction
over patent cases from canton courts, making it difficult to determine what role technical specialization plays versus legal specialization.290 Consequently, any changes to the U.S. system to utilize
TQJs should be preceded by a trial, to ensure that additional
technical expertise brings expected benefits.

46 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 271, 274 (2015).
285. See, e.g., de Werra, supra note 277, at 28-29 (noting that specialized IP courts risk
being “narrow” and could “neglect the overall legal and policy framework that surrounds
certain IP disputes”); Dreyfuss, supra note 45, at 429 (noting dual trial court/appellate court
specialization raises “[t]he possibility of doctrinal deviation” because of a lack of “generalist
input” in the case).
286. See, e.g., Sapna Kumar, Patent Court Specialization, 104 IOWA L. REV. 2511, 2518-19
(2019) (discussing how the Federal Circuit has become more specialized over time, giving rise
to various dysfunctions); Paul R. Gugliuzza, Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO.
L.J. 1437, 1498 (2012) (arguing in favor of giving the Federal Circuit nonexclusive jurisdiction
over a broader cross section of cases to give Federal Circuit judges a more generalist
perspective).
287. See Kumar, supra note 286, at 2528-30 (discussing how the Federal Circuit threatens
separation of powers).
288. ROSA RAFFAELLI, E.U. PARLIAMENT POL’Y DEP’T, DISSENTING OPINIONS IN THE
S UPREME COURTS OF THE M EMBER S TATES 22 (2012), https://www.europarl.
europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201304/20130423ATT64963/20130423ATT64963EN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L33K-ZJ6F] (noting that in Germany, only the Federal Constitutional Court
allows for dissents).
289. See Rigamonti, supra note 226, at 53.
290. See id. at 54.
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IV. INTEGRATING TECHNICAL SPECIALIZATION INTO THE U.S.
JUDICIAL SYSTEM
Trial court judges generally lack access to neutral technical
expertise. Patent litigation is fractured among so many courts that
it is impossible to ensure that all judges possess relevant technical
backgrounds.291 The Federal Circuit has furthermore discouraged
judges from using court-appointed experts, out of a fear that such
experts will unduly influence the proceedings.292 Judges may also be
reluctant to utilize them due to the cost, which gets directly passed
on to the litigants.293 This leaves generalist judges in the position of
having to sift through competing party-hired expert reports to
understand basic scientific and technological concepts.294
A related problem is that under the current U.S. system, several
district courts hear a high volume of patent cases and are overloaded with work.295 After the Supreme Court’s decision regarding
venue in TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC,296
patent litigation soared in the District of Delaware, Central District
of California, and Northern District of California.297 Yet, judicial
appointments and new judgeships have not kept pace in these
291. See Patent Cases Rise, with Two Courts Leading the Nation, U.S. CTS. (Apr. 21, 2014),
https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2014/04/21/patent-cases-rise-two-courts-leading-nation
[https://perma.cc/3WTD-RXDU]; Fromer, supra note 6, at 315.
292. See supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
293. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
294. See supra Part II.A.
295. See Sapna Kumar, Judge-Made Solutions to Patent Litigation, 18 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL.
PROP. 508, 509 (2019) (discussing the need for additional judgeships in several patent-heavy
districts and the reliance of some courts on visiting judges); Examining the Need for New
Federal Judges: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Cts., Intell. Prop., and the Internet, 115th
Cong. 8 (2018) (statement of Hon. Lawrence F. Stengel) (discussing, on behalf of the Judicial
Resources Committee of the Judicial Conference, the “urgent” need for additional judgeships
in the District of Delaware and Eastern District of Texas, as well as the need for two judges
in the Northern District of California).
296. 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1517 (2017) (holding “that a domestic corporation ‘resides’ only in its
State of incorporation for purposes of the patent venue statute”).
297. See Geneva Clark, TC Heartland, Legal Trends, One Year Later, LEX MACHINA
fig.2 (May 23, 2018), https://lexmachina.com/tc-heartland-legal-trends-one-year-later/ [https:
//perma.cc/5GND-GJV3] (discussing how one year after the Supreme Court’s TC Heartland
decision, litigation in the Eastern District of Texas dropped from 36 percent of all filings to
13 percent and cases increased in several district courts).
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courts.298 This has led to overburdened judges turning to creative
strategies to keep up with their growing patent dockets, such as
staying cases while the PTAB undertakes inter partes review.299
Implementing a system in which TQJs and LQJs worked side-byside as peers in U.S. courts is not feasible under the current judicial
system. In the United States, almost all federal cases are heard by
a single judge, not a panel.300 Moving to three-judge panels so that
TQJs and LQJs could jointly decide cases would likely be prohibitively expensive.301 However, expertise does not have to come
directly from Article III judges.302 Congress could instead provide
courts with substantial patent dockets with resources to hire inhouse technical expertise. This would allow judges to decide patent
cases faster and could potentially increase the quality of their
opinions.
Section A proposes that high-volume patent courts utilize
magistrate judges who are both legally and technically qualified.
Section B alternatively proposes that courts utilize technically
trained staff. Finally, Section C proposes limiting all U.S. patent
litigation to a group of geographically diverse urban district courts
to facilitate the integration of technical expertise into the judiciary.

298. See supra note 295; Erin Coe, Delaware Keeps Pace with Crush of Patent Suits, For
Now, LAW360 (Oct. 20, 2017, 5:37 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/976463/delawarekeeps-pace-with-crush-of-patent-suits-for-now [https://perma.cc/8G4P-BQJU] (discussing the
Judicial Conference’s March 2017 recommendation that an additional judgeship be created
for the District of Delaware to help the court with its heavy docket).
299. See William Alsup, Huge Numbers of Patent Cases: How One District Judge Manages
Them, 18 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 111, 120-21 (2019) (discussing the high volume of patent
cases in the Central District of California and his strategy of staying cases pending the
resolution of inter partes review in the PTAB).
300. See 28 U.S.C. § 132(c) (describing how a typical district court proceeding needs to
involve a single judge presiding alone). An exception exists for gerrymandering cases, which
are heard by three-judge district court panels and are directly appealed to the Supreme Court.
Id. § 2284(a).
301. Cf. Andrew MacGregor Smith, Note, Using Impartial Experts in Valuations: A ForumSpecific Approach, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1241, 1274 n.166 (1994) (emphasizing that cost is
a barrier to increasing the size of the judiciary).
302. See Rai, supra note 23, at 897 (noting that, although expertise in scientific fact-finding
would be beneficial at the trial court level, it need not “come directly from the judges”).
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A. Technically Trained Magistrate Judges
Magistrate judges are appointed by a majority of a district court’s
judges to renewable terms303 and are utilized in a variety of ways.304
They may be authorized to handle nondispositive pretrial matters
(such as discovery motions), conduct evidentiary hearings, and
provide proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the
disposition of the case in judgments on the pleadings and motions
for summary judgment.305 With consent of the litigants, magistrate
judges may conduct bench and jury trials,306 including in patent
cases.307 They can also be given other responsibilities that “are not
inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.”308
Various courts already utilize magistrate judges in patent cases.
For example, as part of the Patent Pilot Program, the Northern
District of California has “Patent Magistrate Judges,” who voluntarily hear extra patent cases and preside over them with the
parties’ consent.309 In the District of Delaware, patent cases are
typically referred to a magistrate judge for alternative dispute
resolution.310 Each Delaware magistrate judge is assigned to a
particular district court judge and handles, among other things,

303. 28 U.S.C. § 631(e).
304. See PETER G. MCCABE, FED. BAR ASS’N, A GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATE JUDGES
SYSTEM 19-20 (2016), https://www.fedbar.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/FBA-White-Paper2016-pdf-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/GN6W-8K7H].
305. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
306. Id. § 636(c)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 73(a) (“When authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), a
magistrate judge may, if all parties consent, conduct a civil action or proceeding, including a
jury or nonjury trial.”).
307. See Schwartz, supra note 24, at 270 n.225 (finding nineteen patent cases between 1982
and 2008 decided entirely by a magistrate judge were later appealed to the Federal Circuit).
308. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3).
309. General Order No. 67, U.S. Dist. Ct. N.D. Cal. (Feb. 17, 2015), https://cand.uscourts.
gov/filelibrary/839/General%20Order%2067.pdf [https://perma.cc/8T59-SHJ9]. Eight magistrate judges serve in this role. Patent Pilot Program, U.S. DIST. CT. N. DIST. OF CAL., https://
cand.uscourts.gov/about/court-programs/patent-pilot-program/ [https://perma.cc/K54F-BG2F].
The Eastern District of New York also has nine magistrate judges participating in the pilot
program. Press Release, U.S. Dist. Ct. E. Dist. of New York, EDNY Implements Patent Pilot
Program (Feb. 7, 2012), https://img.nyed.uscourts.gov/files/local_rules/PatentPilotProjectNYED PressRelease.pdf [https://perma.cc/E92Z-L6F2].
310. See Jeff Castellano, The Latest Pretrial Procedures in the District of Delaware, LAW360
(Mar. 25, 2019, 2:01 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1142297/the-latest-pretrialprocedures-in-the-district-of-delaware [https://perma.cc/F9BA-5H4K].
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early motions and discovery.311 The court also has one magistrate
judge who has a Ph.D. in molecular biophysics and has patent
litigation experience.312 The Eastern District of Texas also utilizes
magistrate judges to assist with patent cases.313
Congress could provide funds to district courts with significant
patent dockets to employ full-time or part-time technically trained
magistrate judges.314 Former patent attorneys and administrative
patent judges with technical backgrounds could be hired to handle
Markman hearings and pretrial proceedings in patent cases. They
could also serve as technical advisors to the district judges, explaining difficult technological concepts and providing unbiased tutorials. Because they would also be legally qualified, they could work on
nonpatent cases as necessary to comprise an adequate caseload.
The ideal way to implement this proposal would be for district
courts to hire people with varied technical backgrounds. Courts
could potentially share magistrate judges, either for the entire
district court system or regionally. For example, the District of
Delaware and District of New Jersey both hear a high volume of
patent cases and are geographically close enough to support a
shared pool of expert magistrate judges.315 Likewise, the four federal
courts in California could share, given the frequent short flights
connecting the state.316
To ensure that this proposal would improve patent litigation,
Congress could initiate a trial. It could select a few courts with a
high volume of patent cases to participate and choose one technical
area to focus on, such as biology. Participating courts would then be
provided with funds to hire one or more magistrate judges from the
311. Id.
312. Young Conaway Staff, Jennifer L. Hall Selected as U.S. Magistrate Judge for the
District of Delaware, DEL. IP L. BLOG (Feb. 28, 2019), https://delawareiplawblog.wordpress.
com/2019/02/28/jennifer-l-hall-selected-as-u-s-magistrate-judge-for-the-district-of-delaware/
[https://perma.cc/LSH7-YCYJ].
313. Patent Cases Rise, with Two Courts Leading the Nation, supra note 291.
314. See Di Lello, supra note 24, at 499-500 (proposing the creation of permanent expert
magistrate judges).
315. See Clark, supra note 297 (including the District of New Jersey as a court with a high
volume of patent cases); About U.S. Federal Courts, FED. BAR ASS’N, https://www.fedbar.org/
for-the-public/about-u-s-federal-courts/ [https://perma.cc/RT4D-EZAW] (showing the proximity
of the New Jersey and Delaware districts).
316. See About U.S. Federal Courts, supra note 315 (showing the layout of California
districts).
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relevant technical area with a standard eight-year contract.317 If the
trial is successful, it could be expanded to other high-volume patent
courts or to other technical areas.
As discussed above, a concern exists that generalist judges might
unduly rely upon neutral experts with little vetting. However,
judges on courts with heavy patent dockets are likely to be familiar
with patent law, making the risk of overreliance smaller. Just as
Federal Circuit judges are capable of reviewing technical information from law clerks, district judges who frequently hear patent
cases should be able to review decisions from technically qualified
magistrate judges. If need be, courts could also adjust local rules to
ensure that there is sufficient oversight.318 Furthermore, courts
would presumably exercise greater due diligence when hiring
magistrate judges with eight-year contracts compared to experts
assisting the court for a single case.
One potential concern would be that the use of magistrate judges
could partially undermine the adversarial system, by displacing
party-hired experts. But parties could still use their own experts to
present competing versions of scientific evidence. Unlike with the
current system, however, there would be a decision maker capable
of sifting through the evidence and determining what is credible.319
Demeanor, credentials, and guesswork would no longer play an
outsized role in claim construction.
Another potential issue is finding qualified individuals in certain
areas of technology, such as electrical engineering and computer
science. A nationwide search would likely be required and the salary
would need to be high enough to compete with other employment
opportunities. However, even if a court is able to use technically
trained magistrate judges in only a few areas of technology, this
would represent an improvement over the status quo. Indeed, not all
high-volume courts will need experts in all areas of technology,
317. About Federal Judges, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/aboutfederal-judges [https://perma.cc/W84L-HRRF].
318. Note that a current problem is that the standard of review for magistrate judges
varies by district court. See Steven Callahan, Are Magistrate Judges’ Orders on Claim
Construction Reviewed De Novo by the District Court Judge?, N. DIST. OF TEX. BLOG (June 13,
2014), https://www.ndtexblog.com/2014/06/13/are-magistrate-judges-orders-on-claimconstruction-reviewed-de-novo-by-the-district-court-judge/ [https://perma.cc/PK66-XYKZ].
319. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
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given some specialties cluster in particular geographic regions.320 If
district courts were able to share judges regionally, that would also
reduce the number of people that the court needs to hire.
Using magistrate judges to augment judicial expertise does have
some disadvantages compared to the European systems discussed
above. Particularly in Germany and the proposed UPC, the TQJs
are true peers of the LQJs, allowing them to attract top talent.321
The TQJs need not be legally trained, making the pool of potential
candidates greater.322 Furthermore, in Germany, the same panel
works together on many cases, allowing trust to develop among the
judges.323
However, using magistrate judges represents the best possible
compromise between the U.S. and European systems, allowing an
expert judge to help decide patent cases without having to move to
a three-judge panel system. It takes advantage of the fact that some
U.S. lawyers complete science or technology-related undergraduate
degrees prior to law school. Moreover, utilizing long-term contracts
would allow district judges to develop trust in individual magistrate
judges over time.
If the trial is successful and courts decide to use specialized magistrate judges more broadly, courts could cover their costs by raising
filing fees for patent cases, perhaps through a surcharge for technically complex cases. If the system were implemented nationwide,
the government could fund the system through patent filing fees.324
320. See Shawn P. Miller, Venue One Year After TC Heartland: An Early Empirical
Assessment of the Major Changes in Patent Filing, 52 AKRON L. REV. 763, 804, 807 (2018)
(discussing how pharmaceutical patent cases tend to be clustered in the Districts of Delaware
and New Jersey); Fromer, supra note 30, at 1447 (predicting that if venue were restricted to
the defendant’s principal place of business, cases involving particular technologies would
naturally cluster in certain geographic areas, such as software cases in Silicon Valley, Boston,
and Seattle).
321. See Seuba, supra note 96, at 274.
322. See id. at 280.
323. German FPC Brochure, supra note 210, at 7-8.
324. This is the approach taken by Switzerland. See Swiss Patent Court Act, supra note
232, art. 4 (“The Federal Patent Court is financed by court fees and contributions from the
Swiss Federal Institute of Intellectual Property (IPI) taken from the patent fees annually
collected by the IPI.”); Reglement über die Prozesskosten beim Bundespatentgericht [Regulations on Litigation Costs at the Federal Patent Court] Sept. 28, 2011, arts. 1, 3 (Switz.),
https://www.bundespatentgericht.ch/fileadmin/web-dateien/014.223_Reglement_ueber_
die_Prozesskosten_beim_Bundespatentgericht_EN_per_121212.pdf [https://perma.cc/KWH6VLNK] (regulating court fees as well as the compensation for costs of legal representation).
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B. Technically Trained Staff
Congress could alternatively select a few district courts to
participate in a trial utilizing technically trained staff, selecting a
technical area and providing the courts with a budget to hire one or
more staff members for a set term. These employees would ideally
have some patent background, such as past work experience as a
patent examiner or agent. Existing Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO) examiners could alternatively be granted a three-year leave
of absence to work for a court. Staff could easily assist multiple
courts via video conferencing.
The staff would serve in an advisory role for cases in their
respective areas of expertise. They could observe Markman hearings
and issue nonbinding reports afterwards. They could serve a similar
role to that of a technical advisor, explaining unfamiliar technology
to the judge. This system could be used alone or alongside technically trained magistrate judges.
Similar systems already exist elsewhere in the world. For
example, in Japan’s Intellectual Property High Court, cases heard
before a panel of judges are assigned a full-time judicial research
official, who possesses a relevant technical background and has
patent experience from working as a patent litigator or an examiner
in the Japan Patent Office.325 The court also employs part-time
technical advisors, generally professors or researchers, who serve
two-year terms.326 Several other IP courts—including those of
China, Russia, and South Korea—also rely on internal technical
advisors.327
Having a fixed pool of experts would have several advantages
over the status quo. It would flip the default, allowing district
judges to freely use experts without having to justify their hiring
based on exceptional circumstances.328 It would provide judges with
vetted experts who do not possess any conflicts of interest and
325. See Yasufumi Shiroyama, Japan, PAT. LITIG. L. REV. (Nov. 2019), https://perma.
cc/VS76-8BVY; Technical Advisors in Intellectual Property Lawsuits, INTELL. PROP. HIGH CT.,
http://www.ip.courts.go.jp/eng/documents/expert/index.html [https://perma.cc/S9Z3-APNM];
Seuba, supra note 96, at 271.
326. See Technical Advisors in Intellectual Property Lawsuits, supra note 325.
327. See Seuba, supra note 96, at 270.
328. See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
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whose costs are not directly shifted to the parties.329 The presence
of experts may furthermore lead to faster trial court proceedings
and more accurate claim construction.330 As with the proposal for
magistrate judges, Congress could authorize a trial to verify that the
use of staff leads to improvements before committing to any longterm change.
The use of staff has some drawbacks compared to using magistrate judges. Staff are unlikely to be as carefully vetted as magistrate judges, given the lesser job functions that they would perform.
The interactions between staff and judges would lack transparency, not unlike the current use of technical advisors and law clerks.331
It is also unclear how much staff experts would be able to alleviate
the high workloads that plague many popular patent venues, given
that their duties would be highly circumscribed. Moreover, to the
extent that staff is taken “on loan” from the PTO, there is an
additional risk of industry capture.332 But notwithstanding these
disadvantages, technical staff would likely be a major improvement
over the current system.
C. Restructuring the District Court System for Patent Litigation
One major problem with increasing the technical expertise of the
U.S. judiciary is the fact that ninety-four different district courts
hear patent cases.333 It would be impossible for every court to have
expertise in every scientific or technical discipline. Moreover, judges
who infrequently hear patent cases might be more inclined to
improperly rely upon expert opinions—whether from magistrate
judges or in-house technical advisors. One solution that several
commentators have proposed is to create a single Article III patent
329. See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
330. Note that affirmance rate is not necessarily the best measure of success, given that
it assumes Federal Circuit judges correctly decide claim construction notwithstanding the fact
that they frequently lack technical backgrounds in the area of the cases before them.
331. See supra notes 119-21, 145 and accompanying text.
332. As discussed above, prior work experience can impact how someone views a case.
Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 53, at 345-46. There is a possibility that hiring staff from the
PTO who intend to return to the PTO could lead to skewed decision-making.
333. See Court Role and Structure, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federalcourts/court-role-and-structure [https://perma.cc/5EL5-WSLM] (providing the total number
of U.S. district courts).
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trial court,334 which could then be provided with technically trained
magistrate judges or staff. However, a single patent court would be
vulnerable to tunnel vision, bias, and capture by various interest
groups,335 and the already politicized U.S. judicial appointments
process could become skewed towards overtly pro-patent judges.
Instead of creating a new court, Congress should confer jurisdiction over all U.S. patent cases to a group of existing urban district
courts.336 Factors in selecting which courts could hear patent cases
would include the size of the court’s current patent docket, litigant
access to a major airport, and geographic diversity. For example,
patent cases that used to be filed in the Eastern District of Texas
would instead be litigated in the Northern District of Texas, which
has patent expertise and is located near a major airport. Patent
cases that were filed in district courts in the Eighth Circuit and
Tenth Circuit could go to the District of Utah; Fourth and Sixth
Circuit district patent cases could go to the Eastern District of
Virginia. With patent litigation formally concentrated at the trialcourt level, technically trained magistrate judges or staff could be
hired to assist the courts with their increased workloads.
Concentrating patent cases into a group of courts would likely
lead to greater efficiency.337 As Judge Holderman noted, although
district judges keep abreast of the latest case law from their
regional court of appeals, they do not typically follow current
Federal Circuit cases.338 Consequently, he observed that “only when
334. See Connors, supra note 23, at 802 (proposing a single patent trial court); Rai, supra
note 23, at 880 (maintaining that despite the risk of capture and tunnel vision, a single patent
trial court would be superior to the current system of semi-specialized trial courts); Moore,
supra note 23, at 932 (maintaining that providing a patent trial court with exclusive
jurisdiction would increase the predictability of patent law, alleviate strain on district courts,
and allow the judges to develop expertise).
335. See Rai, supra note 23, at 896-97 (acknowledging the various risks of creating a
specialized patent trial court, but maintaining the advantages outweigh the disadvantages).
336. A tentative list of courts could be: District of Delaware, Central District of California,
Northern District of California, District of New Jersey, Northern District of Illinois, Southern
District of New York, Northern District of Texas, Southern District of Florida, District of
Massachusetts, District of Utah, Eastern District of Virginia. Given the high volume of patent
litigation in the Ninth Circuit, it might make sense for a third court to be located there,
perhaps in the Southern District of California.
337. This conclusion is supported by early evidence from the Patent Pilot Program, which
shows that pilot judges decide patent cases faster than other judges. WILLIAMS ET AL., supra
note 39, at v.
338. Holderman, supra note 2, at 429.

2021]

JUDGING PATENTS

925

a patent case comes our way do we brush up on the latest developments in the law.”339 By reducing the number of judges who can
hear patent cases and boosting the patent caseload for the judges
that can hear them, there will undoubtably be a savings in time.
The judges who used to only sporadically hear patent cases will no
longer have to invest time reading the latest Federal Circuit
decisions.
There are risks to creating semi-specialized trial courts. For
example, the Federal Circuit’s high degree of specialization has led
to numerous dysfunctions, including disregarding agency autonomy
and undermining separation of powers through judicial legislating.340 Locking in the location of where patent litigation must take
place could result in the next Silicon Valley not having a nearby
district court that can hear patent cases. Also, at least one empirical
study suggests that district judges who hear more patent cases are
more likely to rule in favor of the infringer.341
However, de facto specialization already exists at the district
court level. Even after the Supreme Court’s decision in TC Heartland, ten courts hear nearly 75 percent of all patent cases.342 Under
the current system, there are no limits to the percentage of time a
judge can spend on patent cases, leading to some judges becoming
overly specialized.343 Moreover, in choosing the courts that hear
patent litigation, geography and accessibility would be taken into

339. Id.
340. Kumar, supra note 286, at 2520-23, 2526-28.
341. See Lemley et al., supra note 81, at 1138 (analyzing a data set of final district court
patent decisions and finding “that judges with more experience deciding patent cases are less
likely to find for the patentee”).
342. DOCKET NAVIGATOR, 2019 YEAR IN REVIEW 15, https://brochure.docketnavigator.com/
2019-year-in-review/ [https://perma.cc/4344-GEN7]; see also Clark, supra note 297, fig.2
(showing the general patent litigation case filings from May 23, 2017 to May 17, 2018).
343. In 2015, 28 percent of all newly filed U.S. patent cases were before Judge Gilstrap.
Kaleigh Rogers, The Small Town Judge Who Sees a Quarter of the Nation’s Patent Cases, VICE
(May 5, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/aek3pp/the-small-town-judge-whosees-a-quarter-of-the-nations-patent-cases [https://perma.cc/NL43-DCNG]. This amount was
almost double the number of the judge holding the number two position: Judge Schroeder of
the Eastern District of Texas. Matt Chiappardi & Daniel Siegal, Gilstrap Moves Over for
America’s Next Top Patent Judge, LAW360 (June 1, 2017, 7:39 PM), https://www.law360.com/
articles/930023/gilstrap-moves-over-for-america-s-next-top-patent-judge [https://perma.cc/
GN43-8825].
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account to ensure that defendants are not forced to litigate in highly
inconvenient forums.
To help prevent tunnel vision, the patent dockets for individual
judges could be capped. Congress could require that individual
judges on the selected district courts hear no more than 25 percent
patent cases, to ensure that they maintain breadth and do not
become too specialized. Maintaining such a threshold should ensure
that judges are well versed in other areas of law when they are
appointed. If a court’s docket becomes too patent heavy, judges
with patent experience from other courts could sit by designation.
The risk of tunnel vision could be further mitigated by choosing
courts that already have significant nonpatent dockets.
This proposed system could be structured to mitigate some of the
pro-patent bias that has emerged from certain district courts. For
example, Megan La Belle has highlighted how local rules may make
a district court more plaintiff-friendly for patent litigation.344
Congress could pass a Federal Rules of Patent Procedure, as La
Belle advocates,345 and use them to formalize the role of magistrate
judges in patent cases and create a uniform standard of review for
magistrate judges’ claim construction. Patent-specific procedural
rules could also limit district courts’ ability to manufacture patent
dockets for internet-related cases through plaintiff-friendly practices, as the Eastern District of Texas currently does.346
If providing a group of existing courts with exclusive patent
jurisdiction is not feasible, an alternative would be to designate
344. La Belle, supra note 33, at 99-100 (“[P]laintiffs may favor the Eastern District of Texas
because its rules require early disclosure of infringement and invalidity contentions together
with documents supporting those contentions.”).
345. See id. at 110-12 (proposing that Congress pass Federal Rules of Patent Procedure to
unify patent law).
346. Post-TC Heartland, the Eastern District of Texas has continued to employ creative
maneuvers to retain jurisdiction over patent cases. For example, it found venue over patent
infringement suits against Apple, based on Apple stores located in Frisco and Plano, leading
to Apple closing those stores. David Yates, Apple Bolting from Eastern District of Texas, Venue
a Favorite of Patent Trolls, SE. TEX. REC. (Mar. 5, 2019), https://setexasrecord.com/stories/
512106032-apple-bolting-from-eastern-district-of-texas-venue-a-favorite-of-patent-trolls
[https://perma.cc/2FEJ-FWZ9]. It also allowed litigation to proceed against Google based on
the location of servers in East Texas. Malathi Nayak, Google Denied Rehearing in Bid to
Transfer Patent Lawsuit (2), BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 5, 2019, 4:14 PM), https://news.
bloomberglaw.com/ip-law/google-denied-rehearing-in-bid-to-transfer-patent-lawsuit-2
[https://perma.cc/N8L8-XW7H].
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certain courts as being “preferred patent courts” and allow other
courts to transfer patent cases to the closest designated one. Judge
Saris has argued that judges who enjoy patent cases should be given cases from other districts, perhaps by altering venue rules.347
Her district, the District of Massachusetts, has accepted transfers
of patent cases from overburdened courts—a system that Judge
O’Malley thought could be further expanded.348 Allowing courts that
rarely hear patent cases to transfer them to courts with legal and
technical expertise could lead to faster proceedings and higherquality decisions.
CONCLUSION
U.S. district courts are ill-suited to the task of judging patent
cases. Although some judges have legal expertise in patent law, no
one person possesses a sufficient level of knowledge of all the
different scientific fields to be able to understand the full spectrum
of patent claims that are litigated. Although neutral expertise is
theoretically available to judges, in practice, various obstacles
prevent these experts from being widely used. This forces generalist
judges to sift through technical and scientific information provided
by party-hired experts, likely increasing the amount of time it takes
to litigate a patent case and decreasing the accuracy of the decisions.
The German and Swiss systems, as well as the proposed UPC,
illustrate that there are benefits to integrating technical expertise
into the judiciary for patent cases. The German and Swiss FPC’s use
of TQJs has facilitated their ability to quickly and accurately decide
patent cases. In-house technical expertise flips the default, ensuring
that judges always have ready access to trusted knowledge, rather
than forcing judges to justify the need for extra help.
Congress should implement a trial to provide funding for district
courts with substantial patent dockets to hire technically trained
magistrate judges. Magistrate judges could provide support in cases
that are within their areas of expertise, helping to reduce the burden on strained district courts. They could also serve as technical
347. O’Malley et al., supra note 1, at 683-84.
348. Id. at 690.
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advisors to district judges by explaining unfamiliar technology. If
this is not feasible, then Congress should fund a trial providing a
few courts with technical staff.
Furthermore, given that just ten district courts hear three-fourths
of all U.S. patent cases,349 Congress should consider limiting patent
litigation to a group of urban district courts that are geographically
diverse. Patent caseloads could be limited for each judge, to prevent
tunnel vision and reduce the risk of capture. Rules of patent
procedure could be introduced to ensure that courts are fair to both
plaintiffs and defendants, as well as to avoid the pro-patent bias
that is currently seen in some district courts, such as the Eastern
District of Texas.350 Such a change would ensure that all patent
cases are heard by judges who have legal expertise in patent law
and would facilitate the introduction of either technically trained
magistrate judges or staff.

349. PATENT CASES FILED BY YEAR, supra note 8.
350. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.

